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THE CULTURE OF BATTERING AND THE






He always found something wrong with what I did, even if I did what he
asked. No matter what it was. It was never the way he wanted it. I was
either too fat, didn't cook the food right .... I think he wanted to hurt
me. To hurt me in the sense... to make me feel like I was a nothing.
And that I did something wrong, when I didn't do anything wrong...
I can't talk to adults. I don't know how to talk to people because my
opinion doesn't ever count. I feel like I never had an opinion on politics
or on life. I don't know how to interact because he would [always] be
going like this to me [mimicking abuser's gesture of drawing a line with
his index finger]. .. that was his big signal to make me shut up, or he'd
be kicking me under the table to shut my mouth. 1
HE relationship between a battered woman and her abuser frequently
involves communication through subtle phrases and modes of inter-
action that have meanings and symbols idiosyncratically shared by
the two parties-a "culture of battering." This culture is a reflection and an
integral part of the pattern of dominance and abuse that a battered woman
experiences. Recognition of this cultural component of battering relation-
ships has major implications for the policy debate on whether mediation is
an appropriate mechanism for dealing with cases involving domestic vio-
lence, regardless of whether the specific issues to be mediated involve the
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sor of Law, Duke University.
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1. Karla Fischer, The Psychological Impact and Meaning of Court Orders of Protection
for Battered Women (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois (Urbana-Cham-
paign))(on file with author) (text of interview conducted with one of 83 battered women seek-
ing court protection from their abusive partners).
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abuse itself or ancillary matters related to divorce or separation (i.e. child
custody and visitation, child support, or division of property). We argue
here, as a central theme, that because mediation models work on ameliorat-
ing conflict, mediators assume that abuse in a relationship is a product of
interpersonal conflict. This assumption is fundamentally inconsistent with
the dynamics of the relationship and its cultural context of domination and
control. Essentially, both the ideology and the practice of mediation are
incompatible with a culture of battering.
In this article we first explore the culture of battering and its dynamics.2
We specifically refute here theories that posit that battering results exclu-
sively from conflict. In Section III we consider the widespread and ex-
panding practice of referring "domestic relations" cases to mandatory or
voluntary mediation and describe how mediation is practiced when spousal
violence is identified in the couple. In Section IV we critique both the ideol-
ogy and practice of mediation against the background of the culture of bat-
tering. We conclude by recommending that cases should be excluded from
mediation where a culture of battering has been established.
II. THE CULTURE OF BATTERING
The example in the prologue to this article is far from atypical. Battered
women's advocate Mary Pat Brygger, in testimony before Congress, illus-
trated her objection to mediation by describing a case in which a battered
woman and her husband were ordered into mediation by a court to negotiate
their divorce and child custody.3 Prior to the session, the husband
threatened violence if his wife spoke against him and said that throughout
the session he would scratch his nose as a signal to remind her of the poten-
tial consequences if she disobeyed his order.4 The first author of this article
uncovered similar examples of symbolic communication and controlling, in-
timidating behavior in her study of battered women seeking court orders of
protection. 5 The third author, an experienced mediator, was involved in a
session intended to resolve a dispute over property damage. In the midst of
the session the man pushed a pen violently across the table towards the
mediators, causing a stunning effect on his partner's composure and de-
2. Throughout this article we use the female pronoun when referring to victims and the
male pronoun for batterers because most victims of domestic violence are women. See Thur-
man v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1528 n.l (D. Conn. 1984) (women are victims in
29 of 30 spouse abuse cases); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RE-
PORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA (1983) (finding that 95% of
victims are women).
We do not intend to represent the culture of battering as an exclusive type of abusive rela-
tionship. Abuse may arise out of genuine conflict in some relationships; abuse may be nearly
random or constant in others. Ultimately whether the culture of battering is more prevalent
than conflict in abusive relationships is an empirical question. Our criticism goes to the theory
of conflict as the dominant explanation of battering. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying
text.
3. Nina Youngstrom, Laws to Aid Battered Women Backfire, APA MONITOR, Feb.,
1992, at 45.
4. Id.
5. See Fischer, supra note 1 (narrative accounts from participants in this study).
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meanor. Other narrative accounts provide ample illustration of the cultural
features of abusive relationships.
Much of the research on domestic violence has tended to divide itself
along disciplinary lines, with substantial bodies of literature in psychology,
sociology, criminal justice, nursing, and other disciplines. It has also frag-
mented according to the subjects under study. The bulk of work has focused
on battered women, typically those seeking assistance through formal help
sources, or on abusive men, typically those ordered by the court to engage in
counseling. The literature tends to center on the individual psychology of
abused women or that of their abusers or on the various social and economic
factors that constrain escape from abusive relationships. Very little research
has attempted to study abusive couples or abusive families by conceptualiz-
ing the abuse as occurring within a broader relationship or family context. 6
The concept of "culture" as applied to battering is our first attempt to
describe this relationship context, as it helps us to move beyond the individu-
als and understand the important dynamics of abusive relationships. One
definition of culture, "shared information or knowledge encoded in systems
of symbols,"'7 captures an element of the relationship context that exists even
in normal, non-abusive relationships. Through daily interaction and shared
history every couple develops idiosyncratic modes of communication, such
as single word phrases, facial expressions, gestures, tones of voice, and pri-
vate jokes, that may be mysterious or unnoticed to outsiders but which con-
vey clear meaning to the couple themselves.8 Consequently, we use culture
as the paradigm through which to view battering for two reasons. First, we
emphasize that the appropriate level of analysis for understanding the prob-
lem of domestic violence is not that of individual decisions, motivations, or
behaviors, but the dyadic interaction that transcends them-the relationship
context. Second, culture is not only descriptively accurate but also is in-
tended to convey an explicit rejection of pathological terminology such as
"battered woman syndrome," 9 instead highlighting similarities of the dy-
namics between normal and abusive relationships. 10
6. But see JEAN GILES-SIMS, WIFE BATTERING: A SYSTEMS THEORY APPROACH 2-3
(1983) ("[W]e [need to] study the behavior in the context in which it takes place, [so] we can
discover general processes which relate context and behavior in battering relationships.") (em-
phasis omitted). Giles-Sims' notion of context, however, is limited to conflict. Id. at 21-25.
7. Roy G. D'Andrade, Cultural Meaning Systems, in CULTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON
MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 88 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. LeVine eds., 1984).
8. SHARON S. BREHM, INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 216 tbl. 8.2 (1992) (one of the func-
tions of nonverbal communication is to provide information); see also id. at 219 (nonverbal
sensitivity increases with the depth of or commitment to a relationship).
9. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [here-
inafter WALKER (1984)]; LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter
WALKER (1979)]. Our specific intent here is not to reject the value of the important descrip-
tive research conducted by Dr. Walker; rather, it is to critique her analysis of the learned
helplessness theory of battering. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
10. Liz Kelly has also recognized the relationship between normal and abusive relation-
ships, albeit in a slightly different fashion. She has suggested that sexual violence (her term for
all forms of abuse) is a continuum, where violence is "connected to more common, everyday
aspects of male behavior .... 'Typical' and 'aberrant' male behaviour shade into one another."
Liz KELLY, SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 75 (1988). The distinction is that Kelly empha-
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In battering relationships these cultural components become an extension
of the pattern of domination itself, whether it be a nose scratch signal de-
vised specifically for a mediation session, a drawn line gesture used repeat-
edly over the course of the relationship, or perhaps a fleeting facial change."
A gesture that seems innocent to an observer is instantly transformed into a
threatening symbol to the victim of abuse. It is a threat that carries weight
because similar threats with their corresponding consequences have been
carried out before, perhaps many times.' 2
We focus on the communication variable as a way of emphasizing the
subtlety of the dynamics of abusive relationships and the difficulty that out-
siders, even those professionally trained and experienced in dealing with bat-
tering, may have in identifying what is taking place in a controlled setting,
such as mediation. However, the shared knowledge represented by these
private symbols arises out of deeper elements of the culture of battering.
The process by which such information becomes shared knowledge to the
couple is best explained by a description of the elements of the culture of
battering. The first essential element of the culture is the abuse itself, includ-
ing any or all of the multiple forms of abuse: emotional, physical, sexual,
familial, and property. The second element is the relationship context in
which the abuse is folded into a systematic pattern of control and domina-
tion by the abuser. Our emphasis on this cultural aspect of battering is in-
tended to highlight what we believe is a fundamental misinterpretation of
abusive relationships by many scholars and practitioners. Our view rejects
the dominant explanation of battering as conflict; we suggest that in many
relationships, conflict has little, if anything, to do with the causes of bat-
tering. Rather, when conflict is a triggering event it tends to be only an
expression of an attempt to control. The third element involves the ten-
dency, on both the part of the victim and the abuser, to hide, deny, or mini-
mize the abuse and the total control that the abuser attempts to exert on the
victim.
A. DEFINITIONS OF ABUSE
Researchers in the field of domestic violence have not agreed on a uniform
definition of what constitutes violence or an abusive relationship. It is im-
portant to briefly consider this literature in order to, first, expand the defini-
tion of abuse beyond physical assault, and, second, to distinguish
sizes that there is a fine line between abusive and non-abusive behavior exhibited by any indi-
vidual man; our point is that abusive relationships have the same features as normal
relationships.
11. It is frequently reported that abusers' faces change in some observable way, signaling
impending violence. Eg., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 59 (1987)
("Women learned to identify this pattern and often to see changes in the man just before an
attack."); FAITH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED 83-84 (1980) (Francine Hughes' story) ("I
saw him at the door and the look on his face made my heart sink right down into my shoes. I
knew I was in trouble .... Mickey's face took on what Francine had come to know as his
'crazy' look.").
12. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement of rules
through punishment).
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relationships that are characterized by a culture of battering from those in-
volving isolated acts of physical assault or other forms of abuse. Acts of
assault and abuse occur in many domestic disputes and while they might
incur criminal charges, relationships involving a culture of battering are of
another order (they are qualitatively and perhaps quantitatively different as
well).
Richard Gelles and Murray Straus, the authors of two national studies 13
that assessed the prevalence of domestic violence, limited their definition to
physical abuse: "specific, definable acts of omission and commission that are
harmful to individuals in families."' 14 Gelles and Straus surveyed over 3,000
individuals in American homes, measuring the frequency and severity of
physical violence such as slapping, hitting, pushing, beating, or using
weapons. 15
While the bulk of research on domestic violence has implicitly or explic-
itly followed the lead of Gelles and Straus by focusing on physical assaults,
there is growing professional recognition that emotional and sexual forms of
abuse should fall under the rubric of "domestic violence." The reasons for
labeling these as domestic violence run along two lines: 1) emotional and
sexual forms of abuse are commonplace in battered women's experiences,
frequently accompanying the physical assaults-i.e. they are an integral part
of being battered; and 2) emotional and sexual abuse are harmful to women.
As sociologist Liz Kelly has noted, the prevailing stereotype about domes-
tic violence is that assaults are "physical, frequent, and life threatening."' 16
Yet, the reality of battered women's lives does not conform solely to this
image. Advocates for battered women have long noted that financial abuse
and property abuse are forms of emotional abuse inflicted upon women.
Abusers frequently restrict women's access to money 17 and destroy their
personal property'8 in an effort to gain control over them or keep them in a
13. See RICHARD GELLES & MURRAY STRAUS, INTIMATE VIOLENCE: THE CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABUSE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988) [hereinafter GELLES &
STRAUS]; MURRAY STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (1980).
14. GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 13, at 59.
15. Id. at 227.
16. KELLY, supra note 10, at 150.
17. DELL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 83-84 (1976) ("[V]iolent husbands generally han-
dle all of the money;... in some cases the husband takes the car keys and money whenever he
leaves the house."); MILDRED D. PAGELOW, FAMILY VIOLENCE 310 (1984) ("Husbands who
beat their wives keep a tight rein on their wives' actions and money: the last thing in the world
they want is for the women to leave them. One way to ensure that is to tightly control all the
family finances. Even when a wife is gainfully employed, she may have little or nothing to say
about how her contribution is spent, and, in some cases, abusive husbands accompany their
wives on payday so the checks are turned over to them immediately."); WALKER (1979), supra
note 9, at 131-32 (inadequate spending money for household and children); Fischer, supra note
1, at 62 tbl. 9 (61% of sample of 83 battered women who obtained court orders reported that
their abusers had tried to control their money).
18. Fischer, supra note 1, at 62 (30% of sample reported that batterers had abused pets;
70% reported that batterers had destroyed property).
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state of fear.19 Emotional and sexual abuse may be even more common. 20
Forms of emotional abuse include acts that do not constitute overt threats of
injury or violence, such as constant humiliation, insults, degradation, and
ridicule.2' Of course, explicit threats to harm or kill, including those at-
tached to vivid descriptions of the method the abuser would use to carry it
out, also have emotional consequences. 22 The abuser may extend threats of
harm to the victim's extended family 23 or her children 24:
Molly stayed because Jim said he would kill her family if she left, and
she believed him. In addition to his violence toward her, she was begin-
ning to find out more about his violence toward others-men he worked
with, men in bars. Jim warned that her parents' home would be the first
place he would go if he came home and found her gone; he said he would
see them die first and then kill her. 2 5
19. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing how acts of emotional and
property abuse induce fear).
20. GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 13, at 68 (suggesting "that one reason so little research
on emotional abuse has been conducted is that so many of us are guilty of occasional or even
frequent emotional attacks on loved ones that the behavior is too close and too common to
allow for objective research").
21. See examples cited in Fischer, supra note 1, at 62 tbl. 9. The case of Judy Norman, a
North Carolina woman who killed her husband in 1987, represents the extremes of emotional
abuse: he forced her to prostitute herself to support the family and then ridiculed her as a
whore to her family and friends. He called her a "dog," forced her to bark like a dog, eat pet
food out of pet dishes, and lie on the concrete floor next to the bed, because "dogs" can't lie on
beds. State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 378 S.E.2d 8
(N.C. 1989); 378 S.E.2d at 20 (Martin, J., dissenting).
22. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 66. A particularly compelling example of this is offered:
Chuck jumped up and began shouting, 'I've had enough of you. I've had enough
of your shitl' He grabbed a rifle from behind the door and began firing down at
her from the end of the table, his face distorted. Mary could feel the impact of the
bullets and was terrified. She waited for blood to come, for the sensation of pain.
Then Chuck started to laugh wildly, telling her he only had blanks in the gun and
not to be such a fool The children were sobbing, but he made them all finish
their meals, even though one of them became sick
Id. at 67.
23. Batterers typically target their threats to individuals who might provide some tangible
assistance to the women if they leave the relationship. See id. at 66.
24. These threats could include both threats of harm to the children and threats to take
the children away. See id. at 66, 91 ("He warned her that she would 'lose' Kevin if she ever
did anything else to disobey him."). Browne's sample also reported high rates of physical and
sexual assaults against the children (over 51%), enhancing the perceived risk for disobedience.
Id. at 70. The threats may turn to actual harm. See GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 92 (case
study report):
[The child] was only about nine months old. She was in her high chair, and I was
feeding her cereal. I had to go to the bathroom, something like that, and I asked
him to finish feeding her. When I came out of the bathroom, he got mad at her
for something, and he pushed the bowl of cereal right in her hair. I don't know
why he got mad at her. I don't know what made him do that at that instant, but
he did do that, unless he was trying to make me mad or something .... There
were a few times that she was just walking and he picked her up and heaved her
from one side of the room to another. To make me behave.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 57; see also WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 148 (finding
that "[t]hreats ... to the battered women's families were standard routine"); Fischer, supra
note 1, at 62 (36% of sample reported that abusers had threatened family and friends).
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Researchers who have investigated the phenomenon 26 find that rates of
battered women who have been sexually assaulted consistently fall in the
thirty-three percent to sixty percent range.27 Sexual abuse frequently in-
volves acts that could also be classified as physical assaults, blurring the line
between physical and sexual abuse, such as the insertion of objects into the
woman's vagina, forced anal or oral sex, bondage, forced sex with others,
and sex with animals. 28 Sexual violence sometimes marks the end of a physi-
cally abusive incident;29 for others, the sexual violence begins the assault.30
Some of the abuse involves the use of pornography, as batterers may force
their partners to look at or watch pornographic materials31 and/or act out
pictures or scenes from these materials. 32
Emotional, familial, and sexual abuse have also been recently labeled as
domestic violence because these forms of assault harm 33 women, both psy-
chologically and physically. 34 Some battered women have described psycho-
26. One possible explanation for why sexual abuse has been neglected might be because
most state laws still retain the marital rape exemption in some form. Karla Fischer, Defining
the Boundaries of Admissible Expert Psychological Testimony on Rape Trauma, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 691, 694 n.28.
27. KELLY, supra note 10, at 130 (60% sexually assaulted); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE
IN MARRIAGE 60-68 (1982) (citing other studies); see Fischer, supra note 1, at 63 tbl. 9 (45%
sexually abused); Cris M. Sullivan et al., An Advocacy Intervention Program for Women with
Abusive Partners: Initial Evaluation, 20 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 309, 314 (1992) (48%
raped); see also sources cited in BROWNE, supra note 11, at 100 (33%-43% experience marital
rape).
28. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 95-96; see also WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 119-24
(case studies).
29. See, e.g., McNuLTY, supra note 11, at 174.
30. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 10, at 113 ("We got to the flat and he dragged me into the
bedroom and... forced me into bed, made me have sex with him and he scratched all my back
open. Then he got a tin of deodorant and sprayed it into every scratch ... then he started
laughing .... ").
31. Fischer's sample reported a 12% rate of this form of abuse. See Fischer, supra note 1,
at 63 tbl. 9.
32. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 27, at 84 (24% reported they had "been upset by any-
one trying to get you to do what they'd seen in pornographic pictures, movies, or books");
Fischer, supra note 1, at 63 tbl. 9 (10% forced to act out pornography). Kelly, supra note 10,
provides several narrative accounts of this particular form of abuse:
[A] lot of my relationship with him [was] some kind ofsexual assault. He used to
use pornography at the same time as having sex with me - it was as ifI became
one of those pictures... That's a much more subtle form of assault.
Id. at 108.
I felt more like an object than anything else, something to be experimented upon.
When it was getting really bad he used to come home with all these various con-
traptions. It was almost like I wasn't involved. I was just a piece of apparatus in
an experiment. Whatever happened in this magazine we used to have to do, it was
like a manual. I'd think 'Oh God, I better read it to see what I've got to do
tonight.'
Id. at 111.
33. As Liz Kelly wrote: "The Oxford English Dictionary defines violence as involving
damage to the self. The damage may be physical, emotional, psychological and/or material.
Violence can be of the body, of the mind or of trust. The exercise of violence involves the
denial of the victims' will and autonomy." KELLY, supra note 10, at 39.
34. KELLY, supra note 10, at 41 (defining violence as "any physical, visual, verbal or
sexual act that is experienced by the woman ... at the time or later, as a threat, invasion or
assault, that has the effect of hurting her or degrading her and/or takes away her ability to
control intimate contact") (emphasis added).
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logical degradation and humiliation as the most painful abuse they have
experienced. 35 The impact of this kind of abuse can be long lasting and
harmful to women's psychological health. 36 Emotional, familial, and sexual
abuse may also affect women's physical health. Physical symptoms such as
high blood pressure, ulcers, chronic back pain, chronic fatigue, and tension
headaches may manifest as a result of physical abuse or as a result of the
stress produced by the other forms of violence. 37 Research on the psycho-
logical impact of rape suggests that sexual abuse, particularly when the as-
sailant is known to the woman, has deleterious mental health effects
including depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and a loss of self esteem and
self worth. 38
Several researchers have developed measures of emotional abuse that cor-
respond to the physical abuse scale developed by Gelles and Straus.39 For
35. WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 172. To illustrate:
I've been verbally abused as well. It takes you a long time to... you may say you
feel good and you may ... but inside, you know what's been said to you and it
hurts for a long time. You need to build up your self-image and make yourself
feel like you're a useful person, that you're valuable, and that you're a good par-
ent. You might think these things, and you may say them ... I'm gonna prove it
to myself
Kathleen Ferraro & John Johnson, How Women Experience Battering: The Process of Victimi-
zation, 30 Soc. PROBS. 325, 334 (1983) [hereinafter Ferraro & Johnson]. As one of the partici-
pants in Fischer's study summarized, "The bruises healed on my body, but they'll never go
away on my heart." See Fischer, supra note 1.
36. Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive Rela-
tionships, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 107, 114 (1990) (72% of sample reported that emotional abuse
had a more severe impact on them than physical abuse).
37. See Suzanne Kerouac et al., Dimensions of Health in Violent Families, 7 HEALTH
CARE FOR WOMEN INT'L 413, 420-25 (1986); Rachel Rodriguez, Perception of Health Needs
by Battered Women, 12 RESPONSE: To THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 22,
22-23 (1989). Francine Hughes' story illustrates the physical and psychological changes that
may result from ongoing assaults:
As the months of torture went on, Francine became aware of strange physical
symptoms. She felt nausea. Sometimes she could eat nothing; at other times she
was ravenously hungry and ate until she was sick She felt starved for air, suffo-
cated, unable to take a breath deep enough to satisfy her. Herpulse raced and she
was dizzy even lying down. It occurred to her that she might have cancer. "I'd
imagine I was going to die an awful death and think, 'Oh God, then the kids will
have no one but Mickeyl'"
There were psychological changes, too. Francine, who had always loved being
with people, became afraid of them. She, who had once thought herself pretty, felt
ugly, unattractive, stupid. She avoided speaking to neighbors on the street. In the
supermarket if she saw someone she knew she looked the other way. She thought
everyone in Dansville must despise her for living a degrading life. Vague fears
came over her. It frightened her to go out of the house or to drive a car. She felt
inadequate, helpless in every way. Rather than borrow Mickey's car, she asked
him to drive her wherever she had to go...
She had to fight suicidal impulses.
McNULTY, supra note 11, at 128.
38. See Bonnie L. Katz, The Psychological Impact of Stranger Versus Nonstranger Rape
on Victims' Recovery, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN PROBLEM 251 (Andrea Parrot
& Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991); Mary Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There
Differences in the Victims' Experience?, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1 (1988).
39. The Conflict Tactics Scale, developed originally by Straus, is the most commonly used
measure in research on family violence. Various behaviors are organized on the scale which
begins with non-violent actions such as discussing an issue calmly, and ends with violent ones,
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example, Marshall includes behavior such as "shook a fist at you" and
"made threatening gestures."'4 Follingstad and colleagues define six catego-
ries of emotional abuse, including ridicule, jealousy, and property abuse.41
Tolman developed an inventory that includes items such as "my partner
tried to make me feel like I was crazy" and "my partner yelled and screamed
at me."' 42 Finally, Sullivan's index contains items like "lied to you or delib-
erately misled you" and "ridiculed or criticized you in public."
43
Gelles and Straus' physical abuse measure has received heavy criticism
that could also be applied to the emotional abuse scales described above. 44
Abstracted from their social reality, the reports of abuse that result from
these quantitative scales lack a description of the relationship and family
context in which the abusive behaviors are occurring.45 For example, a wo-
man involved in an emotional divorce might respond affirmatively to many
of the scale items, such as denigration, outbursts of anger and perhaps even
physical assault, but this would not necessarily capture the fear, domination,
and control that characterizes culture of battering relationships.
Establishing that there has been abuse in a relationship is a necessary but
insufficient condition to conclude that a culture of battering exists. For our
such as slapping, pushing, and using a knife or gun. The individual reporting the violence is
asked to indicate how frequently this behavior occurs on a scale from "never" to "more than 4
times/week". Severity of violence is divided into minor violence, defined as pushing, kicking,
throwing objects, shoving, or slapping, and severe violence, such as beating or threatening use
or actual use of knives or guns. GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 13, at 250-51; see infra note 96
(instructions for the scale).
40. See Linda L. Marshall, Development of the Severity of Violence Against Women Scales,
7 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 103, 114 (1992).
41. See Follingstad, supra note 36, at 113.
42. See Richard M. Tolman, The Development of a Measure of Psychological Maltreat-
ment of Women by their Male Partners, 4 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 159, 162 (1989).
43. See Cris Sullivan et al., Index of Psychological Abuse: Development of a Measure,
Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association (Aug. 6,
1991).
44. According to Browne, supra note 11, at 69, the Conflict Tactics Scale fails to account
for the physical injuries that result from specific acts of abuse. She argues that the context of
abuse needs to be taken into account. Browne defines context of abuse as the "force with
which an act is carried out, the number of repetitions of the act, and the clustering of different
acts together." Id. (emphasis omitted). In a later paper, Browne expands this contextual argu-
ment to include the failure of the scale to measure other aspects of the violence, such as
whether it occurred in the course of a conflict or whether it happened unexpectedly. Irene H.
Frieze & Angela Browne, Violence in Marriage, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 163, 168-69 (Lloyd
Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989) [hereinafter Frieze & Browne].
Liz Kelly labeled the scale a "poorly designed research instrument:"
The CTS fails to distinguish between offensive and defensive acts and contains
no questions on either the frequency or consequences (injury) of violent acts.
The scaling implicit in the CTS assumed that all acts within categories are the
same, whether they are committed by a woman or a man and whether they are
part of on-going abuse or a single event. The hierarchy of 'tactics' implies that
pushing and throwing is by definition more serious than any amount of verbal or
emotional abuse. The CTS, therefore, provided data on acts of violence ab-
stracted from both the context in which they occurred and their consequences
and meaning to the individuals involved.
KELLY, supra note 10, at 65-66.
45. See LEE ANN HOFF, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS 9 (1990) (arguing that acts
of violence stripped of context distort the severity and meaning of domestic violence).
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purposes, the line between a relationship where there has been abuse and a
relationship where there is a culture of battering is the important distinction
to make. The other two elements that comprise relationship context, a pat-
tern of domination and control and denial and minimization of the abuse,
must also be present in the relationship for a culture of battering to be
established.
B. THE SYSTEMATIC PATTERN OF CONTROL AND DOMINATION
1. The Context of Rule-Making
The abuser who signaled silence to his victim by gesturing with his index
finger in our opening narrative46 illustrates quite clearly the dynamic of con-
trol and domination 47 and the symbols that are used to enforce it. The cul-
ture of her relationship, like that of other domestic violence victims, consists
of two roles within the family: that of rule-maker/rule-enforcer and the
one(s) that must follow the rules. As explained by two women from
Fischer's study:
He has this macho male ego thing like, I am King Kong and no one is
going to [control me]. If you don't do this then I'm going to beat you type
of attitude. I'm the ruler, you go by my rules, if you don't, you know, you
have to pay the consequences. He has this attitude that I'm Mr. Macho
and I'm going to show you my physical force through, you know, by beat-
ing you.
He was a dictator in this house and it seemed like the more our rela-
tionship progressed the worse that got. When he'd get upset, he'd go hit-
ting the walls. He didn't really throw things a lot but every once in a
while he'd throw or kick something, threw the cat. He knows that cat is
kind of real special to me, and he'd get mad, pick him up and throw him
outside and say, well, he can stay out for a while, I'm tired of him or
something. It never really hurt the cat, but it was enough, I mean, it
upset me that he even did it anyway. 48
a. The Ruler and the Ruled
Battered women have frequently reported that abusers are extremely con-
trolling of the everyday activities of the family. 49 This domination can be all
46. See supra text accompanying note 1.
47. We are not the first to suggest that battering is a process of control and domination.
See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 70 (1991) (urging "cultural redefinition of battering as a
process of power and control"). We are the first, we believe, to provide an empirical descrip-
tion of how this process might unfold in a battering relationship.
48. Fischer, supra note 1.
49. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 10, at 131 ("[M]any abusive men felt they should control
almost every aspect of household organization, from where the clock stood on the mantelpiece,
to how often windows were cleaned, to how the table should be set."). In Fischer's study, the
husband of the woman in our opening anecdote, see supra text accompanying note 1, poured
over the TV Guide when it arrived in the mail each week, highlighted in yellow what the
family was to watch, and highlighted in pink what the family was to tape on their VCR. This
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encompassing: as one of the batterers from Angela Browne's study was fond
of stating, "[y]ou're going to dance to my music ... be the kind of wife I
want you to be." 50 Charlotte Fedders' account51 of the escalating rules im-
posed by her husband over the course of their seventeen year, extremely
violent marriage is particularly illuminating about the range of control that
abusers can exert. Her husband insisted that no one (including guests and
their toddler children) wear shoes in the house, that the furniture be in the
same indentations in the carpet, that the vacuum marks in the carpet be
parallel, and that any sand that spilled from the children's sandbox during
their play be removed from the surrounding grass. 52 Charlotte was not al-
lowed to write checks from their joint checking account. 53 Any real or per-
ceived infraction of these rules could result in her husband beating her, or at
the very least, the expression of his irritation that was frequently a harbinger
to a beating. 54
Typically, battered women talk to the men about the abuse, partly as an
attempt to concretize the rules that are connected to the absence of abuse.55
In turn, many abusers promise to stop the abuse.56 One abuser in Browne's
study formalized such discussions into a written document, where he set
forth a list of conditions that his victim was to agree to in exchange for
cessation of his violence. These conditions were: 1) the children were to
keep their rooms clean without being told; 2) the children could not argue
with each other; 3) he was to have absolute freedom to come and go as he
wished, and could have a girlfriend if he wanted one; 4) she would perform
oral sex on him anytime he requested; and 5) she would have anal sex with
him.57 He enforced this document shortly after she "agreed" to it and con-
tinued to sexually assault her until his death.58 This abuser simply made
schedule could not be deviated from, even if he was not home in the evening. Fischer, supra
note 1.
50. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 60.
51. CHARLOTTE FEDDERS & LAURA ELLIOT, SHATrERED DREAMS (1987) [hereinafter
FEDDERS & ELLIOT].
52. Id. at 138-41.
53. Id. at 158-59.
54. Id. at 158-59, 207-08.
55. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 65, 66 tbl. 10.
56. Promises to end the violence might be part of the reconciliation, or "honeymoon"
phase, of Lenore Walker's cycle theory of violence. It is well established that violence in a
relationship escalates over time, increasing in frequency and severity. WALKER (1984), supra
note 9, at 43-44, 130. Fischer, supra note 1, at 37 tbl. 5 (64% of sample reported that abuse at
time of obtaining court protection order was becoming worse). This escalation is consistent
with the cyclical nature of abuse, first recorded by Walker. WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at
55-70 (battering occurs in three cycles: 1) tension building phase, 2) acute battering incident,
and 3) honeymoon stage (contrite & loving behavior)); see also KELLY, supra note 10, at 147
("It was really cyclical actually, really incredible. And the odd thing was that in the good
periods, I hardly remembered the bad times. It was almost as if I was leading two different
lives .... There were long gaps sometimes ... If it had been continuous battering then I'd
have just gone. There were always times of hope.").
It may be that the escalation is triggered by episodes of rebellion, as it was in Francine
Hughes' case. See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
57. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 99.
58. Id. at 100.
19931 2127
SMU LAW REVIEW
explicit the rules in the relationship and made it obvious that abuse was the
punishment for violating the rules.
In many abusive relationships, however, the rules do not need to be ver-
bally expressed to create a family atmosphere controlled by the batterer.
Charlotte Fedders' story is a prototype of a battered woman who becomes
very good at reading nonverbal messages from her abuser. She writes of how
she restricted the play of her four young boys in order to avoid her hus-
band's increasingly subtle signs of displeasure:
Eventually... we just stopped using the living room and the family room
because little things out ofplace would make him angry.... If [the boys']
rooms were a mess, he'd complain to me, so I was reluctant to let them
play there. So they pretty much played in the basement.... I'd let them
play only in the backyard, not the front, because John was so proud and
particular about it. He wanted it perfectly green, and orderly... He
didn't like my putting a swing set up for the kids in the backyard, so it
had to go all the way in the back, where no one would see it.59
The characteristics of the Fedders' marriage are consistent with accounts
reported by other battered women indicating that the violence does not need
to be a constant presence for the victims to feel threatened that it could erupt
at any point,60 nor does the explosion always have to be physical. Violence
need only symbolize the threat of future abuse in order to keep the victim in
fear and control her behavior. For example, Marshall has called property
abuse "symbolic violence."'61 The following accounts from Fischer's study
explain how this could be so:
When I came back to the apartment, he had smashed every single piece
of furniture in the bedroom. On the wall there was the red dress that I
had worn to my office Christmas party the week before. It was stuck to
the wall with a butcher knife through the heart.
I saw him standing out in the street with an ax handle over his shoul-
der, yelling for me to come out, and luckily I was at a house with people
and a telephone to get help. So he trashed my car. There was glass all
59. FEDDERS & ELLIOT, supra note 51, at 140-41.
60. As Walker stated:
Violence as a discipline does not cause a permanent change in the way someone
will behave unless the victim believes that the possibility of violence is always
present. However, batterers are very accomplished at getting their victims to
believe that it is. A climate of fear is established which is maintained by the
ever-present potential for extremely violent explosions.
WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 148.
The narrative examples provided by Kelly confirm this:
I remember the tension of becoming aware that I had to notice what I was saying
all the time, to make sure I didn't offend him. I had become afraid of him.
I didn't know when he was going to knock on the door, what he was going to be
like, what mood he was going to be in, whether I was going to get hit... Was he
going to scar me for life? Was he going to punch me in the head and knock me
out and I'd die?
KELLY, supra note 10, at 127.
61. Marshall, supra note,40, at 107.
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over the street from my car windows that he busted out. And he was
walking... with the ax handle in his hand ... [When I saw the dam-
age] I just fell on my car, I never cried so hard in my life. I could not
believe it ... there was glass clear over in this extra yard. And, it wasn't
that it was a good car or anything. It was just the fact that it could have
been my head. 62
In fact, physical abuse may only be utilized by abusers who are too unsophis-
ticated to be able to control their victims with verbal or sexual violence.
b. The Internalization of Rules of Time: The Process of Self-
Censorship
As time goes on in a battering relationship, as in the Fedders' case, specific
rules and their attached consequences give way to a general climate of in-
creasingly subtle control, where the batterer needs to do less and less to
structure his family's behavior. Caught up in the day to day fight for sur-
vival, the victims may not even be aware of this censorship process:
I would do anything for him. I would cook, clean, you know, pick up his
shit, whatever. He could have said, drop off the face of the earth, and,
sure, I would have done it .... I was so stressed out that I was scared
from one day to the next of what was going to happen with him. When I
first moved in things were pretty happy-go-lucky. In the second year I
was starting to... I wouldn't go out, I'd make excuses to people. I got
to understanding that he didn't want me telling a lot of people where I
lived, who I was seeing... That started clicking in ... I wouldn't let my
family come over to the house because I didn't know what kind of a mood
he was going to be in, if he would want company. I was living a lie for
two and a half years. 61
I suppose you might be able to prevent [the abuse] by suppressing so
much of yourself, learning to avoid the kind of behaviour that precipitates
it. But then that in itself is a form of violence. 64
What fuels this self censorship process 65 is the responsibility the victim
feels, both as a woman socialized into believing that making relationships
work is her job, and the responsibility added by the abuser, who blames her
for the "failure" of the relationship, as evidenced by the occurrence of
abuse.66 Women are taught in our society to care for others, to make deci-
sions around what is best for other people, even if it denigrates their own
62. Fischer, supra note 1.
63. Fischer, supra note 1.
64. KELLY, supra note 10, at 180.
65. The idea that women censor their behavior in response to fear of violence from their
partners is similar to empirical accounts that women's fear of sexual assaults by strangers leads
to a behavioral change in response to these threats. See MARGARET I. GORDON & STEPHANIE
RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 90-117 (1989) (women's fear affects choices of day-to-day activi-
ties); KELLY, supra note 10, at 31 ("The threat and reality of sexual violence may result in
women developing strategies for self-protection which result in apparently voluntary limita-
tions of mobility, territory, and encounters.").
66. The complexity of self-blaming responses is discussed in Dale T. Miller & Carol A.
Porter, Self-Blame in Victims of Violence, 39 J. Soc. ISSUES 139 (1983).
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needs. 67 Batterers reinforce this societal message by consistently blaming
women for everything that goes awry in their lives.68 The end result is mani-
fested in frantic attempts by the woman to be the perfect wife, mother, and
homemaker. 69
67. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 78-79. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE (1984); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative.- Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 154 (1991).
68. Francine Hughes' story contains a particularly potent example of this:
He became terribly agitated over small problems, and no matter how a crisis be-
gan, it always became Francine's fault.
"Like one day he couldn'tfind a particular paper he needed. He began empty-
ing drawers and tearing up the place. He was cursing and saying, 'I can't find
this goddamn thing I have to take to Social Security.' Then he said, 'You look for
it! You're probably the one who lost it anyway.' I said, 'Mickey, I never saw it.
What does it look like? Just tell me and I'll help you look' I started hunting for
it while Mickey paced the floor, drinking coffee and watching me. 'You better
find it,' he said. 'You better find it fast.' My head began to pound. I was so
scared if I didn'tfind it soon he'd begin to drink. Then he blamed the kids. He
began to curse and rant about them getting into his things, and that was my fault,
too. Before Ifound the paper in the pocket of his windbreaker where he'd left it, I
was trembling all over, a nervous wreck."
MCNULTY, supra note 11, at 143.
One of the women from Angela Browne's study reported a similar irrational level of blame;
in her case it was for the abuser's automobile accident, which occurred while she was not even
in the car:
[He] wrecked the truck, injured himself and was hospitalized for several weeks.
After he returned home, he drank heavily and was abusive every day. He would
hit Molly with his crutches, throw his food at the wall, and chew snuff and spit it
in her face. He felt the accident had ruined his business and he blamed Molly for
driving him to it. He kept her awake until early morning while he raged, and
threw bottles of beer at her or poured hot coffee over her if she fell asleep.
BROWNE, supra note 11, at 91.
69. The women from Liz Kelly's study provided several illustrations of this:
The best way to avoid it was to show as little reaction as possible ... Even though I
didn'tfeel I loved him at the time, I hated him (anger), I was saying that I loved
him. I had to be the absolute perfect housewife ... I wouldn't dare argue with
him or challenge him -for fear of my life actually.
You kept the house tidy, you got the children out of the way, you got meals
ready when he walked in . . . all sorts of pandering about, women's skills you
know. I got quite skilled over the years, I never knew when it was going to happen,
it was just avoidance.
I just tried to be self-effacing in every sense- you know, if I made myself
invisible he won't see me to hit me.
I would just be quite passive, try not to provoke him verbally or physically. I
would just do anything he wanted me to do, try and be calm and pleasant just to
try and avoid it or if there was a warning I would flee the house.
KELLY, supra note 10, at 180. Similarly, one of the women in Giles-Sims' study reported that:[I felt] very confused. When it really first started happening, I didn't know
what was going on. I couldn'tfigure it out. I stayed with him quite a while when
he was doing this, because I like figured out well, maybe he'll come home this
time, and I'll do something different. Maybe that might please him and he'll stay
off my back I would always try to do things that ... that wouldn't make him
angry. He was never satisfied. He'd get mad for some stupid reason and take it
out on me.
GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 70. As summarized by Heather McGregor in Conceptualizing
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c. The Enforcement of Rules by Punishment
The rules that battered women try desperately to follow become estab-
lished in a pattern of domination and control by the enforcement mechanism
used by the batterer. Batterers may either simply respond with abuse when
a rule is broken,70 or they may make it clear that the abuse is punishment for
violations:
He felt I was a child. He'd say, "I'm going to teach you a lesson; raise
you right. " He'd make himself angry, lecturing me. I was always caught
off guard by his attacks. They seemed to be mainly dependent on his
mood, rather than on things going on around him. He would slap me, hit
with his fists, twist my arms behind my back, call me names, and say
awful things about-and to-my mother. And then he'd tell me it was
for my own good. If I tried to say anything, he'd call that "talking back"
and I'd get hit. But if I kept quiet, he'd say I was ignoring him. No
matter what I did, it just got worse and worse, once it got started. 71
He said, "Well, I'm going to take you out to ... I'm gonna take you
somewhere and I'm gonna teach you a lesson. ". . He turned around
and he said to [the child], "Well, you know, . . .your mother is nothing
but a lying bitch-a lying cold bitch. ".. . [He] drove us to the next town
out on this kind of, like, deserted road. He stopped and I got out of the
Jeep, and he got out of the Jeep, and he raised his fist to me a couple of
times and each time I'd duck ... [Hie was gonna leave me there to walk
and to think things over-like I had really been doing something bad and
he was punishing me. 72
d. Cementing the Connection Through Fear, Emotional Abuse, and
Social Isolation
At the core of these types of systematic control and domination is the fear
that battered women have about future violence. This fear can be a result of
Male Violence Against Female Partners: Political Implications of Therapeutic Responses, 11
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. FAM. THERAPY 65, 67 (1990):
[Women] will try to cook better meals, stay awake for him no matter what time
he gets home, have sex with him whenever he wants, have the children in bed
before he gets home, have the house immaculate, lose weight, get a job, give up a
job, give up friendships, keep thoughts and opinions private, sever relations with
their family of origin, move house, move town, suggest counseling.
70. McGregor, supra note 69, at 67.
71. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 60.
72. GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 75-76.
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past beatings or threats of physical73 or sexual abuse.74 The fear may also be
triggered by any verbal or nonverbal symbol associated with the onset of an
abusive incident. 75 In some cases, threats of harm against the victim's ex-
tended family 76 or against her children may be as effective in controlling her
behavior as physical violence itself:
[The child] was only about nine months old. She was in her high chair,
and I was feeding her cereal I had to go to the bathroom, something like
that, and I asked him to finish feeding her. When I came out of the
bathroom he got mad at her for something, and he pushed the bowl of
cereal right in her hair. I don't know why he got mad at her. I don't
know what made him do that at that instant, but he did do that, unless
he was trying to make me mad or something... There were a few times
that she wasjust walking and he picked her up and heaved her from one
side of the room to another. To make me behave.77
Control is also maintained, and fear is intensified, through the extensive
use of humiliation, ridicule, criticism, and other forms of emotional abuse;
financial abuse; and social isolation. It is undoubtedly easier to control
someone if they think less of themselves. It is difficult for victims to leave
their abusers when they do not have access to money. Similarly, limiting
victims' interactions with other people enhances the batterers' domination
over the family by both cutting off potential sources of support and by mak-
ing the boundary between the family culture of battering and the outside
world more defined. 78
73. "What he did wasn't exactly battering but it was the threat. I remember one night I
spent the whole night in a state of terror, nothing less than terror, all night.... And that was
worse to me than getting whacked. That waiting without confrontation is just so frightening."
KELLY, supra note 10, at 143.
I just couldn't take all this... me feeling so numb inside and this feeling of panic.
And this feeling of being caged-all at the same time. Panicked and caged, and
not being able to go anywhere and do anything. It was like he was an animal
trainer, coming and beating on the bars of the cage with a stick--only he was
outside the bars so he couldn't get hurt.
GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 114.
74. Another example is provided by Kelly:
His fantasy was ... for me to be in a gang bang, against my will, so he could be in
another room - not actually watching - but in another room knowing I was
there with a load of men, screaming and shouting for help. My fear was that it
would happen. He often used to say to me, "Wouldn't it be nice if you went out
one night and got raped and came home and told me about itl"
KELLY, supra note 10, at 114.
75. Kathleen K. Wayland & John E. Lockman, Gender Differences in the Affective Re-
sponse to Marital Aggression, J. FAM. VIOLENCE (forthcoming) (finding that fear was strongly
correlated with psychological abuse) [hereinafter Wayland & Lockman].
76. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
77. GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 92 (emphasis added); see supra note 24-25 and accompa-
nying text.
78. See KELLY, supra note 10, at 132 (batterers deliberately isolate their victims). Some-
times the batterers' denial of social interaction to the victim is part of the rule-making context,
where victims must secure approval before they visit any of their friends:
I was not allowed to have friends. Not allowed to go anywhere with [the child]
Jesse by myself This is why it was so bad, 'cause he told me he didn't trust me,
therefore I couldn't go places with Jesse by myself, or I couldn't go to the store
with Jesse, or I couldn't spend time with Jesse, or I couldn't go out and have any
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2. Rebellion and Resistance
The pattern of rule-making and rule-enforcing, nested within the control
and domination exerted by the batterer over his family, is frequently inter-
spersed with episodes of rebellion by the victims. 79 Expanding on Hannah
Arendt's argument that force is only used when power is threatened, Liz
Kelly suggested that the victim's resistance strategies forces the abuser to
make his coercive power explicit.80 Any threat, however small, to the
abuser's authority within the family is likely to be met with violence: "I
think because I was sticking up for myself the hidings got harder. I think
that's what it was, he wanted to show that he was still my governor."'8'
These resistance incidents are not initiated with ignorance on the part of
victims, as they are very much aware that any type of challenge to the bat-
terer is likely to result in further, perhaps escalating, violence.8 2
Rebellion can take one of several different forms. The first form is a delib-
erate but not active verbal confrontation. To illustrate from the story of
Francine Hughes, she described an incident when she violated the implicit
rule that she was not to leave the apartment while her husband was gone:
One day, on a furtive outing, Francine dropped into a drugstore and
bought some nail polish. When Mickey came home he instantly noticed
her painted nails. He asked how she had gotten the polish. She told him
she had gone for a walk. Mickey said he didn't think she needed to go
for walks. Francine began to pour out her unhappiness-how she hated
the idleness, the loneliness, the gloomy high-ceilinged apartment. Mickey
was unsympathetic. Francine protested she had the right to go for a walk
kind of relationship with any girls, or I couldn't do anything. Not unless he gave
me permission, and so forth and so on.
GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 76-77.
79. Liz Kelly has compellingly argued that researchers have ignored the study of how
battered women (and other victims of male violence) resist abuse: "[M]ost research on sexual
violence has neglected, or indeed at times misread, the acts of resistance and challenge that
women.., take which display strength and determination. Much feminist theory has... paid
insufficient attention to analyzing and documenting women's persistent and consistent resist-
ance to it." KELLY, supra note 10, at 185. This passive victim imagery is based on the un-
tested assumptions of learned helplessness theory and does not in fact conform to battered
women's experiences. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (critiquing learned help-
lessness theory). Fischer also reported that, in her sample, many battered women said that
although the abuser controlled the family's daily activities or finances, they would refuse to
allow him to dominate decisions about the children; the women were willing to risk challeng-
ing him for the best interests of their children. Fischer, supra note 1, at 64.
80. KELLY, supra note 10, at 22.
81. Id. at 178. The battered woman's rebellion of speaking out may also extend to protect
her children:
I did start ... trying to do something about the way he was reacting with [the
child]. I think that afterwards was when he started hitting me. He didn't hit me
before that. When I started standing up for my children, when I thought he was
abusing [her], he started hitting me.
GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 93.
82. KELLY, supra note 10, at 179. It is well established that violence in a relationship
escalates over time, increasing in frequency and severity. See supra note 56. It may be that the
escalation is triggered by episodes of rebellion, as it was in Francine Hughes' case. See infra
text accompanying notes 83-86.
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if she chose. The scene ended in a beating. 83
What is important to extract from this narrative is not only that the abuse
resulted from Francine's rebellion, but also the subtle way in which she
chose to resist. She spoke to her husband about her needs. When he was
unresponsive to that language, she switched to something more directly con-
frontative-her rights as an individual-and she was beaten for this.
Francine's abuser was threatened because she was focused on her needs and
rights, rather than his. The abuser's place as the authoritarian in his family
is challenged if his victim thinks about herself instead of concentrating ex-
clusively on him. 84
In addition to indirect methods of rebellion, Francine's story includes sev-
eral episodes where she directly confronted her batterer by simply refusing
to do what he ordered her to do. Her husband did not hesitate to abuse her
when she declined to fetch a drink for a friend during a party at their home,
an obvious and public challenge to his authority in the household.85 The
most poignant instance of Francine's resistance iswhen she declined to back
down when her batterer dictated that she could not visit her mother:
Francine saw a chance to visit her mother; [her friends] would give her a
ride both ways.
Mickey objected. "There's no sense in it. You don't need to go. What
do you want to go up to Jackson for?"
"I haven't seen Mom in a long time, " Francine said, "I'd just like to
see her, that's all. I've got nothing to do here."
Mickey scowled. "You don't need to go to Jackson to look for some-
thing to do, and you don't need to see your mom. "
Suddenly Francine rebelled. "Ijust couldn't stand Mickey's eternal
domination one more minute. I picked up my coat and started for the
door. I said, "I want to see Mom and I'm going, no matter what you say.
83. McNULTY, supra note 11, at 64-65.
84. See, e.g., James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FAMILY ABUSE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH, 133, 145-49 (G. Hotaling et al. eds.,
1988) (batterers own descriptions of the causes of their abuse suggest strong themes of male
entitlement, including the "right" to the priority of his needs over her needs); see also sources
cited id. at 149.
85. McNULTY, supra note 11, at 73. As Francine described:
Mickey enjoyed weekend parties with friends, drinking beer and listening to mu-
sic. One Saturday a group gathered in the Hughes apartment....
"Mickey told me to fetch somebody a beer. I'd been getting beers and emptying
ashtrays all day. I blurted out myfeelings, I said, 'Get it yourself I'm sick of all
this! I'm going to bed!' Mickey's hand shot out and he slapped me with full force
across the face. Everybody shut up while I sat there, my face stinging. I wanted
to die of humiliation. I got up and ran into the bedroom, trying not to cry till I
got there.
Id. It is significant that this instance of abuse was committed in public. The abuser's power
over his victim is enhanced by having witnesses to enforcement of his rules and making the
consequences of rebellion even more serious. See Ferraro & Johnson, supra note 35, at 332.
The impact of public abuse on the victim is quite profound:
[W]e went Christmas shopping and he slapped me in the store because of some
stupid joke I made. People saw it, I know, I felt so stupid, like, they must all
think what a jerk I am, what a sick couple, and I thought, 'God, I must be crazy
to let him do this'
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I don't carel" That did it! Mickey pulled back his fist and floored me
.... Then Mickey beat the living hell out of me. He stayed home from
work and we fought all afternoon."
This was the worst beating Francine had yet. Her face and body were
covered with bruises. 8 6
The noteworthy elements of this piece of Francine's story are the abuse
that was a response to her direct verbal confrontation with her abuser as well
as the surrounding contextual factors. As with the previous example, her
batterer denigrated her needs by forcing his definition of what her needs
were through violence. Francine was inevitably abused when she attempted
to express her needs for the structure of their relationship. This particular
episode of rebellion was threatening to Francine's abuser not only because it
was direct, but also because Francine was attempting to break her imposed
social isolation by visiting her mother. This challenge to his singular hold
over her was probably among the most threatening forms of rebellion. Con-
sequently, it is not surprising that it was met with escalated and serious
violence.
These stories of rebellion and resistance do not map onto the passive vic-
tim image fostered by the dominant theory of battered women's experiences,
learned helplessness. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to en-
gage in a full critique of this theory, we wish to point out the inconsistencies
between the narrative accounts we have described and the tenets of the
theory.
Learned helplessness theory was developed through experiments con-
ducted with dogs, who were trapped in cages and administered variable but
random shocks from which they could not escape. 87 Over time, the dogs
stopped all attempts to leave their cages and would remain submissive and
passive during the "punishment" even when the door was left open.88 Le-
nore Walker presents a straightforward application to battered women, ar-
guing that repeated batterings are analogous to shocks, which decrease the
victim's ability to respond and, eventually, make her completely passive.8 9
The basic implication of Walker's theory is that while battered women may
employ various strategies to attempt to stop the violence early in the rela-
tionship, including leaving the abuser, these attempts decline gradually to-
wards total passivity.
Other researchers have investigated what Walker failed to study: battered
women's behavioral responses90 to the abuse. Fischer specifically asked the
86. MCNULTY, supra note 11, at 65-66.
87. See WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 45-46. Learned helplessness research has also
been conducted with human subjects, comparing depressed and non-depressed people, result-
ing in a reformation of the theory. See WALKER (1984), supra note 9, at 86.
88. See WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 46.
89. Id. at 49. For a thorough critique of the battered woman syndrome, see David
Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent,
72 VA. L. REV. 19 (1986).
90. Walker, in her later study (1984), asked about women's emotional responses (fear,
anxiety, depression, anger, disgust, and hostility) over time. WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at
87. She found that for the emotions most closely linked with helplessness (fear, anxiety, de-
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battered women in her study who had obtained court protective orders about
the methods they had employed in attempting to stop the violence. Of the
thirty-one strategies described, the women in her sample had tried an aver-
age of thirteen different strategies, including talking to the abuser about the
abuse, consulting family and friends, calling the police, leaving him, and
seeking counseling or legal advice. 9' Fischer concluded that the number and
variety of strategies tried suggests that battered women continue over time to
increase their helpseeking rather than to decrease it and become passive. 92
Like the narratives of rebellion described earlier, these attempts at helpseek-
ing are woven into the pattern of domination and control that the batterer
exerts over the woman. 93
It is important to distinguish episodes of rebellion and resistance (of which
helpseeking is one example), which depart from the victim's usual active
attempts to follow the rules, from the consequences of those episodes. The
fact that battered women seek help for the abuse, a process that increases
over time, and periodically rebel against their abusers' rule structures does
not mean that they escape punishment for doing so. That battered women
continue to resist the domination and control asserted against them even in
the face of brutality is further evidence of their resilience and courage. As
pression) resigned acceptance did not increase linearly over time, as the theory would predict.
Id. at 89. See also id. at 88 fig. 2. Nevertheless, she concludes, with no attendant explanation,
that these results "are compatible with learned helplessness theory." Id. at 89. Independent
of these results on emotional responses to abuse over time, the learned helplessness theory
more centrally functions as a predictor of how battered women will behave, such as whether
she will call the police, tell her friends or family, seek counseling, or leave the relationship.
Walker did not ask the women in her study about any of these things. Focusing solely on how
women feel as a test of the theory leaves out a large part of battered women's experiences.
91. Fischer, supra note 1, at 65-68.
92. Id. at 102. See also id. at 109 (finding that study participants, as a whole, had never
been passive). Fischer's data is consistent with prior work in this area, which has examined
the temporal sequence of battered women's behavioral responses. Lee Bowker, studying wo-
men who had "beaten wife beating," asked women to describe the attempts they had made to
stop the abuse in their own words, then coded these responses into three different categories
(personal strategies, informal helpseeking, and formal helpseeking). LEE H. BOWKER, BEAT-
ING WIFE BEATING 36 (1983). The question was asked about five specific instances of abuse
(the first, second, third, "worst," and last). Id. Generally, the number of women attempting
any given strategy increases over time, not decreases. See id. at 64 tbl. 4-1 (personal strate-
gies), 75 tbl. 5-1 (informal help sources), 87 tbl. 6-1 (formal help sources). As Bowker con-
cluded: "It is clear from these data that many battered wives actively fight to remove violence
from their lives. The efforts to end the abuse... were completely at variance with the image of
the battered woman as passively accepting her fate." Id. at 104. This criticism is echoed by
Kelly, supra note 10, at 181 ("The fact that, for many women, their resistance increased before
they finally left, seriously questions the suggestion that women become progressively more
passive and accepting .... [T]he theory of 'learned helplessness' . . . does not reflect the experi-
ence of the women interviewed in this project.") Even Walker reported that helpseeking is
enhanced over time: "As the violence escalated, so did the probability that the battered wo-
men would seek help." WALKER (1984), supra note 9, at 26. She neglected, however, to dis-
cuss the implications this has for learned helplessness theory. See also EDWARD W.
GONDOLF, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS 27-39 (1988) ("causal model of helpseeking
showed an increased helpseeking in response to more dangerous abuse").
93. Note that the sources of help that battered women call on for help are largely rated as
unsuccessful in ending the violence. See, e.g., GONDOLF, supra note 92, at 22 (arguing that it is
the helpers that battered women contact, not the women themselves, who suffer from learned
helplessness); Fischer, supra note 1, at 65, 68.
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illustrated by the narratives above, they risk further and heightened violence
each and every time they resist.94 Resistance breaks the most fundamental
rule in the relationship: do not rebel against any of the rules.
3. The Pretext of Conflict or Disputes
Our argument that abuse occurs within a relationship context of control
and domination is an explicit rejection of the popular belief that abuse is
simply a logical extension of a heated argument or disagreement. Richard
Gelles and Murray Straus, authors of the major assessment tool in the field,
the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS), clearly identify conflict as the cause of fam-
ily violence. 9" In their perspective, all violence flows from conflict, captured
particularly well in the instructions for the CTS:
No matter how well a couple gets along, there are times when they
disagree.., or just have spats or fights because they're in a bad mood or
tired or for some other reason. They also use many different ways df
trying to settle their differences. I'm going to read some things that you
and your partner might do when you have an argument. I would like
you to tell me how many times ... in the past 12 months you .... 96
The CTS has been criticized for precisely the reason that Gelles and
Straus designed it: that it seeks only to identify violence that occurs in the
context of conflict, leaving out violence that occurs "out of the blue,"
although actually as a result of a broken rule, or other context.97 Battered
women's narratives of the context of the abuse suggests quite the opposite of
conflict. Women are typically beaten in a variety of situations that could
hardly be classified as conflict: while sleeping,98 while using the toilet,99 and
while in another room that the batterer suddenly entered to begin his beat-
ing. 100 The usual scenario women describe is that at one moment all is calm
and in the next, there is a major, seemingly untriggered explosion:
I remember walking in, got undressed, and put my robe on, and I was
going to get a glass of milk At one moment we were laying together and
kissing and everything seemed fine. And, it was like a second later, he
was saying that I stayed out too late, and asked who was there and stuff,
and then just... everything blew up. I know he threw me off the bed.
And he told me he was going to beat me to death. And, then he said,
"I'm going to set the trailer on fire with you and your daughter in it."
And then he goes, "well first, bitch, you are going to get me a glass of ice
94. See supra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
95. GELLES & STRAUS, supra note 13, at 78-84. In particular, they note: "Faced with
conflict, one can fight or flee. Because of the nature of family relations, it is not easy to choose
the flight option when conflict erupts. Fighting, then, becomes a main option for resolving
intimate conflict." Id. at 83.
96. Id. at 227. The scale has 19 items, which range from "[d]iscussed an issue calmly" to
"threw ...something" (all considered nonviolent); "[p]ushed, grabbed, or shoved . to
"[u]sed a knife or fired a gun" (all considered violent). Id.
97. E.g., Frieze & Browne, supra note 44, at 168-69.
98. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 59.
99. WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 89.




In addition to the information about context, batterers' behavior during
abusive incidents does not support an image that these are men out of con-
trol with anger. Women have reported deliberate, calculating behavior,
ranging from searching for and destroying a treasured object of hers to strik-
ing her in areas of her body that do not show bruises (e.g. her scalp) or in
areas where she would be embarrassed to show others her bruises.102
Anger and conflict may be frequently confused with violence because both
can be a proxy for abuse. The abuser may in fact be angry when he beats his
victim or a conflict over what she has served for dinner may have developed
before the incident of violence. But this simple coexistence in time does not
mean that the anger or conflict has caused the violence. Lurking underneath
the surface anger or conflict is the batterer's need to express his power over
his victim. Even if the anger is controlled and all sources of conflict are
removed from the relationship, violence still occurs. After all, batterers are
usually involved in other social relationships, at work or elsewhere, where
they become angry or have conflicts with others that they do not abuse. 103
Their ability to cope with anger in some situations but not at home suggests
that conflict and anger are not at the root of domestic violence. Perhaps the
best evidence, however, that abuse is not about anger or conflict is that vio-
lence continues to occur, frequently escalating, after women leave their
abusers.
4. Separation Abuse: Heightened Risk for Abuse Following Separation
The most dangerous time for a battered woman is when she separates
from her partner. 1°4 Many attacks are precipitated in retaliation for her
101. Fischer, supra note 1. Similarly:
I was sitting over there and for no reason he came up and just knocked me over in
the chair. I went down. Me and the chair went down, and he started knocking
me all over the kitchen, and down the hall here, and pushed me and I scraped my
arm, and he pushed me into that thing right there, and I scraped my arm real
bad. I asked him ifI could wash my arm off 'cause it was bleeding a little bit and
he said, "No." Then I went into the bedroom, and he started knocking me
around the bedroom. I was up against the door, and he slapped my face, and I hit
my head on the door sill, and a big bump came up. I said, "Can I go wash my
face?" and he said, "No." It scared me because a big bump just immediately
arose, and that scared me. Then he knocked me down and kicked me a couple of
times, and finally he just walked out. I had bruises all over me, on my face and
on my arms, on my legs, and... I couldn't go right to work
GILES-SIMS, supra note 6, at 1.
102. BROWNE, supra note 11, at 61.
103. McGregor, supra note 69, at 67.
104. Joan Pennington, Family Law Developments, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1159, 1159
(1992) (citing U.S. Department of Justice statistics); see also CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFI-
ABLE HOMICIDE 150-52 (1989); ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 299 (1980); Desmond Ellis,
Post-Separation Woman Abuse: The Contribution of Lawyers as "Barracudas," "Advocates,"
and "Counselors," 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 403, 408 (1987). Martha Mahoney has
named abuse occurring during separation as "separation assault," emphasizing the need to
recognize this form of abuse within battered women's experiences as part of the batterer's
struggle to control and dominate. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 6-7.
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leaving, some as part of an escalation of violence following separation.' 0 5
Separation tends to increase, not decrease the violence,' °' 6 and many of the
women who are murdered by their partners are killed after separation.'0 7
As Martha Mahoney has argued, women who leave their partners may com-
mit the ultimate act of rebellion, which triggers the fatal control/domination
response from the abuser, the final episode of violence.108 As separation
abuse illustrates, the victim's attempt to end the relationship does not ensure
that the control and domination will end; indeed, it may escalate.
C. HIDING, DENYING, AND MINIMIZING THE ABUSE
This third element of the culture of battering involves the shame and em-
barrassment battered women feel, particularly when their injuries are visible
to others. It is typical for women to remain inside their homes until their
bruises and other injuries fade away:
After a beating Francine instinctively tried to hide the fact. She wore
sunglasses and makeup to cover a black eye or stayed out of sight while a
split lip healed, and in fact, no one seemed to notice. Friends and neigh-
bors, Mickey's brothers and their wives, studiously ignored any marks on
her. Francine felt as though she had an unmentionable affliction from,
which everyone turned away. 109
105. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 66. Assaults can occur at three stages: 1) when the
abuser is suspicious of her leaving, 2) when the woman announces her separation, and 3) after
separation. Id. at 65. For example:
I said I couldn't live like that anymore and would leave if he didn't stop. He kept
saying I couldn't leave because we didn't have enough money to support two
households ...
Suddenly he lost his temper ... He stormed upstairs... He came down the
stairs shouting and I saw that he really did have the shotgun. I knew it was fully
loaded ....
I turned around and ran out the front door screaming...
Id. at 66.
We had been separated nine months. I came home late one night with a date....
He knocked... I told him to go home. He wouldn't leave. He rang the bell for
fifteen minutes without stopping...
He started pounding on the door. He broke it in and started a fight with [my
datel...
[1It took two hours to try to get him to leave. He ran around with a butcherknife....
Id. at 66-67.
106. See Ellis, supra note 104, at 408 (citing several studies supporting this conclusion).
107. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 72.
108. See id. at 71.
109. McNuLTY, supra note 11, at 74. Others may overtly deny the victim's experience of
violence:
My mother-in-law knew what was going on, but she wouldn't admit it... I said,
'Mom, what do you think these bruises are?' and she said 'Well, some people just
bruise easy. I do it all the time, bumping into things.'
Ferraro & Johnson, supra note 35, at 333.
No, nobody in the building heard anything. They're afraid to. They didn't hear
him break down the door, or even ring the doorbell for fifteen minutes in the
middle of the night. 'None of them heard anything!'
Mahoney, supra note 47, at 67.
As these experiences indicate, denial occurs on a societal as well as individual level. See id.
at 9. Undoubtedly this social denial facilitates effective denial and minimization by battered
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Something triggered him and he stood up and threw that two liter Pepsi
and hit me right in the eye and my glasses went flying. I had a real nice
black eye. And, immediately when it hit me, I mean, he came over and
said, Baby I didn't mean to hit you. I was, you know, trying to throw it,
but miss you .... He calmed right down, he was real upset about it...
and so loving... I just thought, well, it was one of those once in a lifetime
things. He couldn't believe he even did it.... And, the next day, the
only thing that was said was, you tell people you fell and hit your eye, that
you got drunk and you fell on the chair or something. Well, for two days,
I didn't go out of the house because I didn't really want to try to
explain. 110
Even when it becomes impossible to hide the abuse from others, battered
women may engage in extreme forms of denial or minimize the seriousness
of the abuse or the abuser's intent to harm. Often they rationalize the abuse
as "an accident" or result of excessive drinking. I 1' For example, one of the
women in Walker's earlier study, a physician who had been dating her boy-
friend for about four months, was severely beaten by him when he threw her
down on the kitchen floor and stomped on her. She bled internally, had to
have emergency surgery to remove one of her kidneys, and barely survived.
As the victim explained:
I love him and he loves me. I can't give him up, can I? At my age?
Looking the way I do? Who else would want me?...
I'm really not sure how the whole incident happened. Perhaps it was
my fault. [He] says he really didn't throw me against the stove. He just
pushed at me and I fell and hit the stove. I really believe him. He
couldn't have wanted to hurt me as badly as I was hurt. It really must
have been an accident. 112
There are many ways that battered women minimize the violence. The
coping strategy of minimization, like denial, allows women to escape tempo-
rarily from the pain and trauma of the violence. 1"3 Women may not identify
themselves as battered, citing a lack of physical abuse 1'4 or examples of wo-
women themselves. Fischer reported that most women in her study had experienced one or
multiple forms of "negative consequences" as a result of disclosing the abuse to others, includ-
ing being blamed for the abuse, dismissed as a liar, told what to do, or informed that abuse is
normal. Fischer, supra note 1, at 87.
110. See Fischer, supra note 1.
111. Nearly all (87%) of the women in Fischer's study reported that the abuser's alcohol
and/or drug problem was the cause of the abuse. Fischer, supra note I, at 64.
112. WALKER (1979), supra note 9, at 92-93. Ferraro and Johnson would label this as a
denial of "emotional options," where battered women experience feelings of fear of losing the
one sure relationship they have and that they cannot risk losing that: "He's all I've got. My
dad's gone, and my mother disowned me when I married him. And he's really special. He
understands me, and I understand him. Nobody could take his place." Ferraro & Johnson,
supra note 35, at 330.
113. KELLY, supra note 10, at 193. After a battering incident, the family may simply pick
up where it left off, as if nothing had happened: "[R]outines quickly return to normal. Meals
are served, jobs and schools are attended, and daily chores completed. Even with lingering
pain, bruises, and cuts, the normality of everyday life overrides the strange, confusing memory
of the attack." Ferraro & Johnson, supra note 35, at 329.
114. Fischer notes that reports of physical abuse vary depending on whether an open-ended
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men who have been more severely abused.' 15 Minimizing the abuse also
may involve attending to the positive aspects of the relationship, reducing
the impact of the abuse on the victims' lives. 116 As Liz Kelly wrote, minimi-
zation is fostered by the cyclical nature of domestic violence: "Where there
were long gaps between violent episodes, women tended to minimize the vio-
lence by choosing [to] focus on the time when it was not occurring and by
hoping that it would not occur in the future."' "17
D. SUMMARY
The culture of battering refers to the relationship context of an abusive
relationship. The first of the three elements of the culture of battering is the
abuse, which includes at least one of the following types: physical, emo-
tional, sexual, familial, and property. Professionals have increasingly recog-
nized non-physical forms of abuse as harmful to domestic violence victims.
The second element is the systematic pattern of domination and control that
the batterer exerts over his victim. This pattern may be initiated by the bat-
terer's gradual imposition of a series of rules that his victim must follow or
be punished for violating. Over time, victims may censor their own behavior
in anticipation of yet-unexpressed rules. The abuser's rein on the members
of the household is enhanced by the use of emotional abuse and financial and
social isolation, all of which help keep the victim in fear of impending abuse.
Victims may engage in episodes of rebellion or resistance to the rules, which
are nearly always met with more serious violence. Even separating from the
abuser, an act of rebellion by itself, does not secure the end of the abuse;
rather, it frequently escalates it. The third element, hiding, denying, and
minimizing the abuse, refers to typical coping strategies that battered women
use to reduce the psychological impact of the abuse. Each of these elements
to some degree must be present in order for a culture of battering to be
established.
III. THE WIDESPREAD USE OF MEDIATION FOR
"DOMESTIC DISPUTES"
The use of mediation to resolve what are often generically labeled "domes-
question ("Have you been physically abused?") is asked or whether specific questions about
physically abusive acts (e.g. "Have you been slapped?") are asked. This may be a reflection
that some of the lower forms of physical abuse are not considered abuse by some women.
Fischer, supra note 1, at 59 n. 16. The same is true for sexual abuse. Id.; see also KELLY, supra
note 10, at 145-46.
115. Fischer, supra note 1, at 92. Ferraro and Johnson reported the following case
illustration:
First of all, the first beatings-you can't believe it yourself I'd go to bed, and I'd
cry, and I just couldn't believe this was happening. And I'd wake up the next
morning thinking that couldn't of happened, or maybe it was my fault. It's so
unbelievable that this person that you're married to and you love would do that to
you, but yet you can't leave either because, ya'know, for the other 29 days of the
month that person loves you and is with you.
Ferraro & Johnson, supra note 35, at 334.
116. KELLY, supra note 10, at 146.
117. Id. at 147.
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tic relations issues" is widespread and growing. Many states have enacted
statutes providing for mediation in divorce, child custody, and disputes in-
volving division of property."" 8  In some instances mediation is
mandatory."I 9 In others judges have discretion to assign these civil cases to
mediation on an almost wholesale basis.120 Prosecutors have discretion to
direct criminal cases involving domestic assault to mediation as part of di-
version programs. 12 1 Mediators and mediation service providers are ex-
panding at a tremendous rate and have organized themselves into
professional organizations that argue for even more expansive use of media-
tion.122 The providers argue that mediation is a viable, superior remedy for
domestic disputes, even as a potential remedy for cases in which the central
issue is criminal assault.
We take the position that both the theory and practice of mediation pose
serious problems for its use as a resolution device when a relationship in-
volves a culture of battering. In this section we review a number of statutes
that foster mediation and discuss problems associated with them. We also
consider literature that advocates broadening the uses of mediation, particu-
larly that which suggests mediation is appropriate as a resolution device
when the central issue is domestic assault. This provides a backdrop for
Section IV where we detail the incompatibility of mediation ideology and
practice for domestic violence cases.
A. SELECTED STATUTES AND DISCRETIONARY GUIDELINES
The statistics indicate that a high percentage of women involved in di-
vorce proceedings are likely to be battered, including those in mediation pro-
grams. Many battered women are divorced or separated, 123 confirming
studies that suggest that "the most dangerous time for a woman is when she
divorces or separates from her spouse."' 124 From the perspective of the cul-
ture of battering, separation from the abuser may actually enhance the likeli-
hood and seriousness of the violence because abuse is one of the few tools the
abuser has left to attempt to dominate and control his victim. 125 Estimates
of the number of battered women who enter divorce mediation programs
118. See infra note 128.
119. See infra notes 175-211 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 132-74 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., LINDA A. FOLEY, A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 166
(1993).
122. See, e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 441, 445 (1992).
123. Statistics from the United States Department of Justice, released in January 1991,
indicate that violent crime declined twenty percent between 1973 and 1987, but violent crimes
against women did not decrease at all during that period. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES 14 (1991). In addition, 75%
of women reporting battering were divorced or separated. Id. at 5.
124. Pennington, supra note 104, at 1159.
125. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (separation abuse); see also Fischer,
supra note 1, at 109 (noting same for orders of protection).
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range from a conservative ten percent 126 to fifty percent. 127
Despite the substantial probability that many divorcing women will be
battered, the use of mediation continues to expand. Many states have en-
acted statutes encouraging mediation of domestic relations cases, including
divorce and child custody. 128 Some states require mediation.129 Although
some states exempt battered women from mandatory mediation, 30 alarm-
ingly few provide special rules for domestic violence, and none provide a
mechanism to screen for those cases. Many ignore even the possibility of
domestic violence among divorcing couples and none consider patterns of
domination and control. Some states do not establish minimum credentials
for mediators while others have model provisions for mediator qualifica-
tions. Likewise, some states give the mediator a great deal of authority, but
fail to establish even minimum qualifications for mediators. Others specifi-
cally limit the authority of the mediator. Most statutes provide broad dis-
cretion for the appointment of the mediator. Likewise, some statutes are
quite broad about the subject matter of mediation, while others are quite
limited. The statutes often do not provide or recommend representation for
126. David B. Chandler, Violence, Fear, and Communication: The Variable Impact of Do-
mestic Violence on Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 331, 345 (1990). Chandler believes that the
prevalence of battering in divorce mediation cases has been exaggerated. Id. at 331. His own
study revealed that 23% of couples had a history of violence, id. at 339, but he determined that
only in 10% was the violence "serious." Id. at 345.
127. Stephen K. Erickson & Marilyn S. McKnight, Mediating Spousal Abuse Divorces, 7
MEDIATION Q. 377, 377 (1990) [hereinafter Erickson & McKnight].
128. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.183 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 602.1,
607.1(c)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23-601 to -607 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:351-:356 (West 1991);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C (Supp.
1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-5 (Michie 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29 (1988); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.004 (Vernon Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. § 26.09.015 (West Supp. 1993); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(3) (West Supp. 1992).
Other states authorize conciliation in domestic relations cases. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 25-381.01-.24 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-19 (Burns 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.161 (West 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3-101 to -127 (1991); NEn. REV. STAT. §§ 42-808 to -823 (1988);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3117.01-.08, 3105.091 (Anderson 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-
3-16.2 (1976).
Some states authorize arbitration in domestic relations issues. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.9
(West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.06.010-.910 (West 1987) (all civil actions in
Superior Court, except appeals from Municipal or District Courts for $15,000 or less or up to
$35,000 if two-thirds of Superior Court approves; a majority approval required for child sup-
port issues).
At least one state provides for voluntary participation in mediation only. See MICH COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (West 1988).
129. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. FAM. CT. C.R. (16)(a)(1);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(4) (West Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1989);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.765 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-21 (Supp. 1992).
130. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-311(1) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(b) (West
Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607.1(c)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768(5)(West Supp. 1992); MD. R. S73A(b)(2); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A,
§ 3 (Law, Co-op. Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 458:15-a (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(c) (Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09.1-02 (1991), OR. REV. STAT. § 107.179 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191
(West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(5), (10) (West Supp. 1992).
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the parties, and some give the mediator the authority to exclude legal coun-
sel from the process.131
Below we highlight some of the statutes governing the mediation of do-
mestic cases to illustrate the widespread use of mediation, the inconsistent
implementation of programs from state to state, the absence of screening
mechanisms for cases involving battering, the lack of consistent credential-
ing for mediators, and the obvious ignorance of the risks in mediating "dis-
putes" that arise out of a culture of battering.
1. The Discretion of the Court - Permitting the Judge to Order Mediation
Many states give courts broad discretion to order mediation in domestic
cases. 132 In Alaska, the court may order mediation for child custody, di-
vorce, and annulment cases.133 The statute permits the judge to appoint the
mediator, although the parties may challenge peremptorily one mediator. 134
There does not appear to be anything in the statute outlining qualifications
for mediators or guidelines for appointment. The statute provides for the
presence of counsel in divorce mediation, 135 but does not provide for the
presence of counsel during custody mediation. 136 There is nothing in the
Alaska statute that specifically deals with issues of domestic violence,
although in divorce mediation the parties may withdraw after participation
in the first mediation conference. 137
Some statutes authorize court-ordered mediation, but provide exceptions
for abuse cases. 138 The difficulty in most of these cases is that no real mech-
anism exists for identifying the abuse. For example, Minnesota provides
that a domestic relations matter may be set for mediation prior to, concur-
rent with, or subsequent to the setting of the matter for hearing. 139 Interest-
131. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607(d) (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(b)
(1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(3) (West Supp. 1990). The general trend in the statutes to
fail to recognize the likelihood that many couples entering mediation will have a history of
violence is reflected in the American Bar Association standards for family dispute mediators.
The ABA House of Delegates adopted the "Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in
Family Disputes" on August 8, 1984. Forum, National Institute for Dispute Resolution, Dec.
1984, at 5-9. Nothing concerning spousal violence or abuse is highlighted in these standards.
132. An Iowa court may require custody mediation where the parties do not agree to joint
custody. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1992). In addition, the child may be re-
quired to participate. Id.
In Louisiana, the parties may be required to mediate their differences in a custody or visita-
tion proceeding. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:351-:356 (West 1991).
See also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.24.060 (Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-129.5
(1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.183 (West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 602.1,
607.l(c)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-601 to -607 (1988); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C (Supp. 1989);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-5 (Michie 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-29 (1988); TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.004 (Vernon Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 26.09.015 (West Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(3) (West Supp. 1992).
133. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.080, .24.060 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
134. Id. § 25.24.060(b) (Supp. 1992).
135. Id. § 25.24.060(c) (Supp. 1992).
136. Id. § 25.20.080(b) (1991).
137. Id. § 25.24.060(d) (Supp. 1992).
138. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619 (West Supp. 1992).
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ingly, the mediator is directed to "use best efforts to effect a settlement...
but shall have no coercive authority."' 4 The statute provides an exception
to required mediation if the court determines that there is probable cause
that one of the parties, or a child of a party, "has been physically or sexually
abused by the other party."' 4' The statute also specifies mediator qualifica-
tions, including a minimum of forty hours of mediation training. 42 The
mediation agreement, if any, may not be presented to the court without the
consent of the parties and their counsel.143 If the parties have not reached
an agreement as a result of mediation, the mediator may recommend to the
court that an investigation be conducted to assist the parties to resolve the
"controversy," and in some limited cases the mediator may conduct the
investigation. 44
North Dakota simply says that "the court may order mediation at the
parties' own expense."' 45 Like Minnesota, it also states that the court may
refrain from ordering mediation if the custody, support, or visitation issue
involves or may involve physical or sexual abuse of any party or the child of
any party to the proceeding. ' 46 The statute does not suggest any mechanism
for identifying the abuse. The North Dakota court is directed to appoint a
mediator from a list of qualified mediators approved by the court, 147 and the
supreme court is charged with establishing minimum qualifications.4 The
mediator is specifically prohibited from excluding counsel from the
mediation. 149
At least one state permits the court to consider abuse issues and order
mediation anyway if the court finds it appropriate. An Ohio court is di-
rected to consider the existence of abuse and thereafter may still order medi-
ation, but "only if the court determines that it is in the best interests of the
parties ... and makes specific written findings of fact." 150 The mediator is
required to file a report with the court that may contain a mediated agree-
ment, but the court is not bound by the report.' 5'
Other statutes are more specific about what might be mediated and pro-
vide exclusions for domestic violence cases according to the particular issues
involved in the case. For example, Illinois provides for an exclusion for me-
diation in domestic violence cases enforcing visitation orders, 52 but not
when mediating joint custody. 53 In cases in which joint custody is re-
quested in Illinois, the parties are first required to submit a Joint Parenting
140. Id. § 518.619(1).
141. Id. § 518.619(2).
142. Id. § 518.619(4).
143. Id. § 518.619(7).
144. Id. § 518.619(6).
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-02 (1991).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 14-09.1-03.
148. Id. § 14-09.1-04.
149. Id. § 14-09.1-05.
150. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(A) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
151. Id. § 3109.052(B).
152. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 607.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
153. Id. para. 602.1.
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Agreement. 154 Once the agreement is submitted, any changes, disputes, or
breaches regarding the agreement may be mediated. 55 The court may also
order mediation to determine if joint custody is appropriate. 156 Likewise, in
enforcing visitation orders, the court may order counseling or mediation,
except in cases where there is evidence of domestic violence. 157
In contrast, a number of statutes provide significant detail about the pro-
cedure or qualifications of mediators, and then ignore any possible issues of
domestic abuse. For example, the Kansas statute governing family law is-
sues 158 provides that the "court may order mediation of any contested issue
of child custody or visitation at any time, upon the motion of a party or on
the court's own motion." 159 The statute contains a provision outlining the
appointment and qualifications of the mediator and requires the court to
consider the following: whether an agreement exists for a specific mediator;
conflict and bias issues; the mediator's knowledge of the Kansas judicial sys-
tem and domestic relations cases; the mediator's knowledge of sources for
referral; the mediator's knowledge of child development issues, children's
clinical issues, effects of divorce on children, and psychology of families; and
the mediator's training and experience. 160 Michigan is more specific about
the requirements of mediators: they must have a "license or a limited license
to engage in the practice of psychology . . . or a master's degree in counsel-
ing, social work, or marriage and family counseling."' 16 1
For the states that focus on who the mediator is, many states require
mediators to attend training sessions. Michigan's statute provides for a
training program with not less than forty hours of classroom instruction and
250 hours of practical experience. 162 Wisconsin makes mediation available
and requires that mediators have twenty-five hours of training or not less
than three years experience in the field of dispute resolution. 63 Interest-
ingly, the mediator is charged with the responsibility of determining the ap-
propriateness of mediation. 164 If the mediator finds that it is not
appropriate, he or she will notify the court, and the court will waive media-
tion if the court finds that attending the session will cause undue hardship or
would endanger the health or safety of one of the parties. 16 5 Undue hard-
ship can be established if the mediator finds interspousal battery or domestic
abuse. 166 Whether or not counsel is permitted to be present at a mediation
154. Id. para. 602.1(b).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. para. 607.1(c)(4).
158. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-601 to -607 (1988).
159. Id. § 23-602(a).
160. Id. § 23-602(b).
161. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (West 1988).
162. Id. Minnesota requires 40 hours of training. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.619(4) (West
Supp. 1992).
163. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(4) (West Supp. 1992).
164. Id. § 767.11(6).
165. Id. §§ 767.11(6),(8).
166. Id. § 767.11(8)(b); see also id. §§ 940.19 (defining interspousal battery), 813.12(1)(a)
(defining domestic abuse).
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session is within the discretion of the mediator. 167
The Kansas statute is illustrative of unusual attention paid to the process
of mediation. The statute includes a list under "Duties of Mediator" that
outlines mediator responsibility, including the requirement that the mediator
advise each of the parties to obtain independent legal advice; 168 however, it
allows only the parties to attend the mediation session. 169 Unlike statutes in
many other states, the information obtained during the mediation process is
not privileged. 170 The mediator is obligated to inform the parties that the
mediation process is not privileged and may be subject to disclosure. 171 The
mediator is required to advise each party, in writing, to obtain legal assist-
ance in drafting any agreement and reviewing any agreement drafted by the
other party. 172 It does not speak to issues of domestic violence, but it does
provide that either party may terminate the session any time after the second
session. 173 The mediator may also terminate the session when he or she
believes that continuation would "harm" one or more parties or the chil-
dren, or when meaningful participation is lacking.174 There are no stated
guidelines for defining "harm."
2. Mandatory Mediation
In California, mediation of custody disputes is mandatory, and there is no
provision for exclusion where domestic violence is present. 175 The court ap-
points the mediator, who may be a member of the "professional staff of a
family conciliation court, probation department, or mental health services
agency, or may be any other person or agency designated by the court." 176
In addition, the appointed mediator has the authority to exclude counsel
from the mediation hearings. 177 The statute also provides that the agree-
ment should be limited to specific custody issues 178 and provides for con-
ducting "negotiations in such a way as to equalize power -relationships
between the parties." 179 There are no suggested guidelines or reference to
some resource for recommendations on how to engage in effective methods
of power balancing. The mediator is directed to make "best efforts to effect a
settlement."' 8 0 The mediator may interview the child or children in-
167. Id. § 767.11(10).
168. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(5) (1988).
169. Id. § 23-603(a)(6).
170. Id. § 23-603(a)(9).
171. Id.
172. Id. § 23-603(c).
173. Id. § 23-604(a).
174. Id. § 23-6040).
175. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1993).
176. Id. § 4607(b). Mediators are also required to meet the minimum requirements of a
counselor of conciliation as provided in section 1745 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
Id.
177. Id. § 4607(d).
178. Id. § 4607(e).
179. Id. § 4607.1(c).
180. Id. § 4607(a).
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volved 8 1 and also has the authority to meet with the parties separately when
a request for separate mediation is made or where there has been a history of
domestic violence.' 8 2 Thus, the statute does not exclude domestic violence
cases from mediation but provides for separate mediation.
The California statute has an interesting provision for a "support person"
that may accompany a party to the mediation, but the statute also provides
that the mediator may exclude the support person if the "support person
participates in the mediation session, acts as an advocate, or the presence of
a particular support person is disruptive or disrupts the process of media-
tion."183 One of the problems with the authority given to the California
mediator is that it exists hand in hand with the court's broad discretion to
appoint a mediator who only meets certain minimum qualifications and who
may exclude either party's attorney and "support person."' 18 4
North Carolina has a mandatory mediation statute, 8 5 but gives the court
the authority to waive mediation in cases involving domestic violence. 1 6
North Carolina requires that child custody matters shall be set for mediation
either before or concurrent with the hearing where there is a program estab-
lished. 18 7 The statute provides an exception where, for good cause, the court
can waive mediation.1 88  Good cause may include, among other reasons
listed, allegations of abuse and neglect of a minor child, alcoholism, drug
abuse, undue hardship, voluntary participation in mediation, and spouse
abuse. 18 9 Additionally, either party may move to have the mediator dis-
missed due to bias, undue familiarity with one of the parties, or other preju-
dicial ground.1 90 One of the stated goals of the statute is "[t]o provide a
structured, confidential, nonadversarial setting that will . . . minimize the
stress and anxiety to which the parties, and especially the child, are
subjected."' 19 1
Not only does Oregon have a mandatory mediation statute, 92 it also has a
mandatory arbitration statute in "domestic relations" cases where the only
issue is the division or disposition of property. 193 It does provide the court
with the authority to exempt certain cases for good cause. 194 The statute
also provides for mandatory mediation in joint custody proceedings "within
a mediation program established by the court or as conducted by any media-
tor approved by the court."'' 95 Upon a party's motion, the court may waive
181. Id. § 4607(d).
182. Id. §§ 4607(d), 4607.2(a).
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351.6(c) (West Supp. 1993).
184. Id. §§ 4351.5, .6.
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37 (1989).
186. Id. § 50-13.1(c) (Supp. 1992).
187. Id. § 50-13.1(b) (Supp. 1992).
188. Id. § 50-12.1(c) (Supp. 1992).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 50-13.1(d) (Supp. 1992).
191. Id. § 50-13.1(b)(4) (Supp. 1992).
192. OR. REV. STAT. § 36.405 (Supp. 1992).
193. Id. §§ 34.405(1)(b), 107.765 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
194. Id. § 36.405(2) (Supp. 1992).
195. Id. § 107.179(1) (1990).
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mediation if participation will lead to emotional distress.' 96 The statute does
not specifically speak to abuse, but does have some other protection.
Although the statute gives the court the authority to establish mediation
procedures in other cases, any mediation of property division or
child/spousal support issues requires the written approval of the parties and
their counsel.' 97 Additionally, the mediator may not make any substantive
recommendations to the court without approval of the parties.198 The stat-
ute provides for minimum educational and experience qualifications as well
as gives the court the discretion to employ or contract for mediators directly
or through public or private agencies. 199 The mediation proceedings are pri-
vate and confidential. 2 °°
The Utah statute establishes a mandatory mediation program,20 1 but pro-
vides an exception for cases that would cause undue hardship to or threaten
the mental or physical health or safety of either of the parties, or the child or
children of the parties, or cases in which a party has engaged or been victim-
ized in interspousal domestic violence. 20 2
In at least one state, mediation is encouraged as a matter of public policy.
Maine's statute has a formal finding that mediated resolutions of disputes
between parents is in the best interest of minor children. 20 3 Thus, the statute
provides that when there are minor children in a custody action, mediation
is mandatory. 2 4 The statute provides that the court may waive the media-
tion requirement for extraordinary cause supported by affidavit. 20 5 Once in-
volved in the mediation session, the court must determine that the parties
made a good faith effort to mediate. 20 6 If the court does not find good faith,
it may order the parties to mediation, may dismiss the action, may assess
attorney's fees and costs, or may impose any other sanction that is "appro-
priate. ' 20 7 In addition, the child custody statute states that the mediator
should consider the "existence of a history of domestic abuse between the
parents" 20 8 when mediating child custody issues. 20 9 The statute also pro-
vides that the court shall not consider abandonment of the residence as a
factor in determining parental rights when the parent who left was "physi-
cally harmed or seriously threatened with physical harm ... and that harm
or threat of harm was causally related to the abandonment. ' 2 10 However,
one chapter in its domestic relations statute precludes protection order cases
196. Id. § 107.179(3) (1990).
197. Id. § 107.765(1) (1990).
198. Id. § 107.765(2) (1990).
199. Id. § 107.775 (1990).
200. Id. § 107.600 (1990).
201. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-21 (Supp. 1992).
202. Id. § 30-3-22.
203. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 214, 581, 752 (West Supp. 1992).




208. Id. §§ 214(5)(K-1), 581(5)(K-1), 752(5)(K-1).
209. Id.




B. MEDIATION IN SPOUSAL ABUSE CASES
There are two types of legal cases where mediation with batterers and
their victims is likely to occur: 1) criminal assault/battery cases; and 2) di-
vorce and child custody. While the type of case will determine the exact
form that the agreement will take, both criminal and divorce mediation ses-
sions with abusive couples will not differ markedly from mediation with gen-
eral populations. Whether the context is criminal or civil, mediation that
has the elimination of violence against the victim as its goal will result in a
settlement of some variation like: "Mr. Abuser agrees not to hit Ms. Victim
and Ms. Victim agrees to talk to Mr. Abuser about any subject provided that
he has not been drinking.1212 Our purpose in this section is limited: we wish
to simply provide a descriptive summary of how mediation with domestic
violence is carried out. We follow this with our critical evaluation of the
weaknesses of these mediation programs.
1. Mediation in Criminal Assault/Battery Cases
In addition to the many jurisdictions where mediation is used for divorce
and child custody, every year thousands of cases in which the specific issue is
criminal assault are referred annually to mediation centers. 213 The referrals
are made by judges, district attorneys, and court clerks. In many instances
public mediation centers send their personnel to the court to screen for such
cases and court personnel then give their imprimatur to attempts to contact
the parties for mediation.
The utilization of mediation for criminal assault/battery against spouses
has been encouraged and supported by articles in scholarly journals that
provide a rationale for mediation as an alternative to the court systems. A
leading article by Bethel and Singer, for example, labeled mediation as an
important new remedy for domestic violence cases. 214 They described a
model program of community mediation that included domestic violence
cases within its claimed scope of expertise. This center, called the "Citizens'
Complaint Center", operates in the District of Columbia and is separate
211. Id. § 768(5).
212. Charles A. Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of Domes-
tic Violence, 7 VT. L. REV. 15, 23 n. 15 (1982) (example of criminal case mediation agreement
where husband agrees "that I will not physically harm in any way my wife" and wife agrees
"that I will talk and communicate with [my husband] on any subject provided [he] has not
been drinking when he approaches me") [hereinafter Bethel & Singer].
213. See U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST: FI-
NAL EVALUATION REPORT 22, 27 (1980) [hereinafter Final Evaluation Report]. See generally
Chandler, supra note 126; Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless, Preseparation Abuse, Marital
Conflict Mediation, and Postseparation Abuse, 9 MEDIATION Q. 205 (1992) [hereinafter Ellis &
Stuckless]; Anne E. Menard & Anthony J. Salius, Judicial Response to Family Violence: The
Importance of Message, 7 MEDIATION Q. 293 (1990) [hereinafter Menard & Salius]; Ann W.
Yellott, Mediation and Domestic Violence: A Call for Collaboration, 8 MEDIATION Q. 39
(1990).
214. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 15.
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from the prosecutor's office.2 15 Like all disputes that the center handles,
mediation in domestic violence cases occurs only if both parties agree. 21 6
The mediation occurs in a single hearing set for a specific time and date, and
typically two mediators are assigned to each case. 21 7 Bethel and Singer iden-
tified mediation as faster, cheaper, and empowering of both parties because it
requires direct involvement of both in the resolution process. 21 8 They also
pointed out that it lessens the demand on the resources of the legal system
because it does not require the time of judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys.2 1
9
With a slightly different spin, Corcoran and Melamed 220 have similarly
urged consideration of mediation on the grounds that it is less remote and
impersonal than the court system that has traditionally been unresponsive to
battered women.22 1 Battered women are not protected, they claim, by re-
straining orders, by the police, who frequently fail to arrest the abuser, by
prosecutors, who infrequently prosecute domestic cases, or by judges and
juries, who refuse to convict or sentence to jail the rare abuser who enters
the system.222 Criminal prosecution only attempts to control domestic vio-
lence (and does so inadequately), without addressing the societal causes of
battering.223 In these authors' view, what is needed is more attention to
compassionate approaches to dealing with domestic violence, approaches
that incorporate support and treatment for both victims and offenders. 224
By addressing the violence directly, including its causes and methods of re-
habilitation, the "couple may actually experience relief and support in know-
ing that others have shared their experiences .... ,,225 Like Bethel and
Singer, they argue that mediation offers "the prospect of empowerment to
the victim, rehabilitation of the batterer, and, as a model of constructive
conflict resolution, an opportunity to end the cycle of violence. ' ' 226 Media-
215. Id. at 25. Even though the center is technically separate, a complaint might lead to
the initiation of criminal charges or a protection order. Id. The center specifically contem-
plated that much of its caseload would be intrafamily cases, in part because the three law
enforcement agencies who organized the center are mandated by the D.C. Code to cooperate
in the disposition of intrafamily offenses. Id. at 25 n.18.
216. Id. at 26.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 25.
219. Id. at 15.
220. Kathleen 0. Corcoran & James C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empowerment:
Spousal Abuse and Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 303, 311 (1990) [hereinafter Corcoran &
Melamed].
221. Id. at 307-08.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 309.
224. Id. at 310.
225. Id. at 311.
226. Id. But see Barbara Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered
Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 326-27 (1990). Hart notes:
[M]ediation offers false promises to battered women-promises of cooperation,
honest communication, safety, amicable postdivorce collaboration in parenting,
improved communication, and fairness. No mediator, no matter how skillful or
sensitive to domestic violence, can transform the belief systems and conduct of
batterers in the mediation arena and ensure that these promises are realized.
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tion can be effective in the cessation of further violence, they suggest, be-
cause the process models other approaches to resolving conflicts that are
nonabusive.227 Mediation may have immediate practical effects as well, in-
cluding the ability to structure a prompt protective agreement involving the
appropriate criminal justice mechanisms 228 or an agreement that the abuser
will seek counseling. 229
Corcoran and Melamed propose several modifications to the mediation
process to address concerns raised primarily by victim advocates about me-
diation of domestic violence cases. First, they suggest that mediation in-
clude victim advocates or the victim's attorney: individuals who balance
negotiating power. The presence of non-neutral individuals may eliminate
covert intimidation so that the rights of the victim can be better protected. 230
Second, they suggest the use of private caucusing with the parties to en-
courage disclosure about intimidation or abuse and check on the victim's
safety.23' Third, they suggest the use of prerequisites to mediation, such as
counseling or protective orders to encourage victims and abusers to obtain
outside help. 232 Fourth, they suggest that mediators take affirmative steps,
through the use of questionnaire or interview screening, to determine
whether there has been abuse in the relationship. 233
To support the position that mediation can have a positive effect for bat-
tered women and their abusers, Corcoran and Melamed cite the study con-
ducted by Bethel and Singer comparing the outcome of mediation cases
involving domestic violence with cases that did not involve domestic vio-
lence.234 Bethel and Singer had mediation staff contact participants by tele-
phone approximately two months after mediation was attempted. 235
Statistically, in comparing mediated domestic violence cases with non-vio-
lent cases, the authors found no significant differences between the samples
in terms of the parties' satisfaction with the mediation process, their satisfac-
tion with the agreement, and satisfaction with the extent to which the agree-
ment was reported to have been adhered to.236 Based on data that they do
227. Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 220, at 311. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, sug-
gest that the use of the "ground rules" of mediation can change the parties' method of interact-
ing. As an example, the mediator will insist that each party listen to the other without
interrupting: "courteousness may not previously have been the parties' strong point; the medi-
ation process is an exemplary one in that couples are shown at least a glimpse of a more
respectful way to interact." Id. at 368. But this presumes that changing various communica-
tion strategies, should those even generalize to use outside the context of mediation, is the
reason for the abuse. This does not conform with accounts given by battered women when
describing their relationships. Often women point to at least some violence emerging "out of
the blue" or as a result of manufactured "arguments." See supra notes 97-103 and accompany-
ing text.
228. Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 220, at 311.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 312.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 312, 314.
233. Id. at 313.
234. Id. at 311.
235. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 26.
236. Id. at 27. The authors did not, however, present the raw data comparing the domestic
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not provide for the reader, Bethel and Singer concluded that domestic vio-
lence cases are "not less suitable for mediation than other interpersonal dis-
putes."' 237  While Bethel and Singer conceded that, perhaps, mediation
should not be used for the most serious cases of spousal violence, they also
set forth the caveat that more research might prove mediation's usefulness in
those instances. 238
Despite Bethel and Singer's claim that mediation may protect battered
women from further violence, other empirical work indicates that this may
not be true. For example, Desmond Ellis found that battered women were
more likely to be abused after separation if they went through mediation
rather than adjudication with lawyers. 239 He reported that attorneys were
more likely than mediators to use particular strategies to "challenge" the
batterer. For instance, lawyers might seek to increase the adverse conse-
quences of violence by enlisting the help of law enforcement through orders
of protection or police involvement. 24 0
Ellis' empirical study is cited by advocates for battered women who have
repeatedly emphasized that victims should never have to negotiate for their
physical safety. The advocates argue that safety is a basic right and under
no circumstances should a woman ever have to bargain it away. 24I Forcing
victims to negotiate with their abusers in this fashion both compromises the
message that domestic violence is a crime242 and enhances the power imbal-
ance between the parties.243 Some assert that mediation should be used in
conjunction with other intervention efforts and that "it is never appropriate
to mediate about stopping the violence."' 244 However, even for some who
advocate the more limited use, the "empowerment" of the victims of spousal
abuse is commonly pointed to as one of the positive outcomes of
mediation. 245
violence from the other cases, so an independent statistical evaluation of this claim is not
possible.
237. Id. at 27.
238. Id. at 16:
The following discussion will assume that some cases are suitable for mediation
while others are not. It is nonetheless important to note that there are no data
to support this assumption. It is a normative judgment, based upon considera-
tions of equity, our current knowledge of the mediation process, and common
perceptions of the function of our criminal law. More experience with media-
tion programs may produce evidence that this judgment is too conservative.
239. Ellis, supra note 104, at 408-10.
240. Id.
241. Hart, supra note 226, at 326-27.
242. See, e.g., Menard & Salius, supra note 213, at 298.
243. Hart, supra note 226, at 320-22.
244. Yellott, supra note 213, at 43; see also Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
57, 100 (1984).
245. Yellot, supra note 213, at 45. The argument that mediation is empowering for bat-
tered women is not substantially different from the more general argument that mediation is
empowering for all women. A number of scholars and practitioners have severely criticized
this claim, suggesting that it may have just the opposite effect by causing women to compro-
mise financial and child custody issues and, perhaps, even harm whatever vestiges of self es-
teem they have salvaged or are trying to develop. Bryan, supra note 122, at 445, 446-81;




The rationales offered for the use of mediation in divorce cases where
there has been violence in the relationship are not substantially different than
those cited for the criminal cases. Erickson and McKnight, for example,
representing themselves as experienced mediators with domestic violence di-
vorce cases, 246 offer the claim that mediation not only reduces the likelihood
of future abuse, but also "encourages cooperative interaction," and may "re-
duce hostility and establish clear boundaries for the couple. '247 To accom-
plish these goals, mediation with abusive couples must be done by trained
and experienced mediators who employ a variation of the standard media-
tion process.248
Although Erickson and McKnight do not mention the qualifications
needed for mediators, they propose several adaptations to the mediation pro-
cess to accommodate domestic violence cases. Grounding their trio of spe-
cial rules in establishing safety for the victim, they suggest that the mediator
first attempt to uncover the history of abuse in the couple.249 The first rule
for mediators is to take the abuse seriously as an "issue" rather than as true
fact,250 and immediately begin to focus on protection, boundaries, communi-
cation procedures, and safety. 25' The second rule mediators are encouraged
to follow is to make a strong statement that there is never an excuse for
abuse. Accomplishing this requires mediators to avoid certain topics of dis-
cussion, including inquiring how the "incident" of abuse came about, or who
was at fault. 252 The third rule is a list of specific steps to be taken with the
couple including 1) providing the victim with information about protection
orders; 2) discussing additional precautions, such as calling the police; 3)
establishing clear boundaries about the exchange of children and contact be-
tween the parties; 4) encouraging the victim to seek sensitive counsel; 5)
asking each party to bring their attorneys to mediation sessions; and 6) con-
sidering whether a battered woman's advocate might be useful to the victim
during mediation.253
Like those who advocate mediation in the criminal context, Erickson and
McKnight find certain categories of domestic violence cases inappropriate
for mediation. Most of their exclusion criteria involve the behavior of the
abuser, such as the husband "who totally discounts everything his wife says
plan to address the general issues in this article. We have a narrow focus, namely to examine
the compatibility of mediation ideology and practice with our understanding of the culture of
battering as developed in Section II.
246. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 127, at 378.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 382.
250. Id. This does not mean that the mediator should violate the fundamental principle of
neutrality by "judging" whether or not the abuse is true. They advocate that the mediator
bypass the issue of whether the abuse actually occurred as the victim claims, and proceed to
implement protections not because he/she believes the victim, but because the victim has
raised the issue. Id. at 383-85.
251. Id. at 383.
252. Id. at 382.
253. Id. at 383-84.
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and does and refuses to acknowledge her worth," 254 the husband who is
currently abusing his victim, and the husband who is carrying a weapon or
using drugs and alcohol.255 Couples should also be prevented from engaging
in mediation when they meet and attempt to resolve issues outside of the
formal sessions, or if either party violates the rules of mediation and refuses
to conform.256 Through excluding these inappropriate cases of domestic vi-
olence and following the special procedures for appropriate cases, Erickson
and McKnight believe that mediation will "work" with spousal abuse
couples.257
3. Screening for Domestic Violence in Mediation
The screening issue in mediation of domestic violence cases involves two
separate determinations. First, unlike criminal cases where abuse has al-
ready been tagged as the problem, divorce mediators must have some mech-
anism that identifies the history of violence in the couple's relationship.
Moreover, these mediators must then be able to refer to specific criteria to
determine whether or not the case is an appropriate one for mediation. 258
Second, mediators need to be able to screen for violence that is presently
occurring, particularly if it is a result of the agreement developing through
mediation. The first screening issue is applicable only in divorce mediation
cases, while the second issue is relevant for mediation occurring both in
criminal and civil contexts with abusive couples.
Those who have written about screening mechanisms for uncovering his-
tories of abuse in couples engaging in mediation differ both in the type of
questions asked and how those questions are asked. Erickson and Mc-
Knight give couples a questionnaire that has a single item that identifies
abuse: "Was abuse present in the marriage relationship?" 259 The follow-up
item asks couples to check off the type(s) of abuse present: 1) physical; 2)
emotional; 3) chemical; or 4) other.26° The screening program in Hawaii
described by David Chandler also uses a single question, asked by a inter-
viewer: "Would you tell me if you have been physically abused by your
husband during your relationship?" 261 The Hawaiian program expands the
domain of abuse history by further inquiring when the abuse last occurred,
whether the woman fears future assaults, and whether she feels that the
abuse has limited her ability to communicate "on an equal basis" with her
spouse.262 Only women responding affirmatively to the physical abuse ques-
254. Id. at 387.
255. Id. at 386-87.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 388.
258. It is worth noting here that the screening issue is equally relevant if one takes the
position that battered women should be exempted from divorce mediation, because they first
need to be identified before they can be excluded.
259. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 127, at 381.
260. Id.




tion are asked the last three questions. 263
Linda Girdner provides the most comprehensive assessment of abuse his-
tory in a semi-structured interview format that she calls the Conflict Assess-
ment Protocol.264 First, the Conflict Assessment Protocol probes for the
couple's decision-making patterns, resolution of conflicts in the relationship,
and expressions of anger.265 The purpose of this section of the protocol is
for mediators to be "attuned to the issue of control. ' 266 The second section
of the interview proceeds through a series of questions designed to elicit ac-
knowledgment of specific abusive behaviors. 267 Based on the Conflict Tac-
tics Scale used in domestic violence research, 268 the questions about abuse
tap into emotional, sexual, and physical domains. 269 The interview closes
with specific questions about control, jealousy, child abuse, and substance
use.270 Each of these questions is asked of each spouse in an individual ses-
sion, but phrased in terms of whether either partner has abused the other.271
Only the screening procedure described by David Chandler contains a
"when" question that would allow a mediator to know if the abuse is occur-
ring presently, or whether it is merely part of the couple's history.272 Unfor-
tunately, this lack of attention to inquiring about present abuse may reflect
the stereotype that abuse is no longer an issue once the couple seeks to termi-
nate their relationship. As we documented earlier, separation abuse is com-
mon and frequently life-endangering. 273
In short, even the model mediation programs appear to have weak or in-
adequate screening mechanisms to identify cases involving culture of bat-
tering relationships. We strongly suspect that even rudimentary screening is
absent in most other settings, particularly when the issue involves divorce,
child custody, or division of property.
C. SUMMARY
Mediation has become legislators', judges', and prosecutors' preferred
mode of resolution of "domestic issues" cases. While one can infer that a
primary motivation in sending these cases to mediation is that it helps clear
court dockets of troublesome cases, it is also true that a number of theorists
have justified mediation by arguing that it is a superior method for resolving
domestic issues disputes-including, in some instances, serious cases of do-
mestic violence. However, even when professionals agree that mediation
263. Id.
264. Linda K. Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screening for Spouse Abuse in Divorce Media-
tion, 7 MEDIATION Q. 365, 366-72 (1990).
265. Id. at 368.
266. Id. at 369.
267. Id. at 369-71.
268. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (description and critique of Conflict
Tactics Scale).
269. Girdner, supra note 264, at 369.
270. Id. at 369-70.
271. Id. at 371.
272. Chandler, supra note 126, at 336.
273. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
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should not proceed when there is a history of spousal abuse, our review sug-
gests that current mechanisms to screen for abuse are inadequate. We now
turn to the issue of the adequacy--or rather inadequacy---of mediation to
provide justice to battered women.
IV. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF MEDIATION IDEOLOGY AND
PRACTICE WITH THE CULTURE OF BATTERING
A. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF MEDIATION IDEOLOGY WITH THE
CULTURE OF BATTERING
Consider the widely quoted definition of mediation set forth by Folberg
and Taylor:
Mediation is an alternative to violence, self-help, or litigation .... It
can be defined as the process by which the participants, together with
the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate dis-
puted issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and
reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs. Me-
diation is a process that emphasizes the participants' own responsibility
for making decisions that affect their lives. It is therefore a self-empow-
ering process.2 7 4
The definition itself reflects what Laura Nader has labeled the "harmony
ideology" underlying mediation as it is currently practiced in the alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) movement. 275 In contrast to the adversary system
which is based on the notion of justice and on the understanding of power
differentials, the harmony model values consensus settlement and manage-
ment of disputes through "healing" processes that "minimize power differ-
entials of class, race, economics, and gender; it articulates the notion that
disputes are generated in relationships by the failure of individuals to act as
they should."' 276 Nader's critique addresses the social and legal systems as a
whole. She argues that the ADR movement has become increasingly coer-
cive and "values means over ends, harmony over justice, and efficiency over
due process. '277
Nader's critique is shared by others who have analyzed the implicit and
explicit assumptions underlying mediation theory. 278 The objections to it
are brought into sharpest focus when mediation assumptions are contrasted
with our analysis of the culture of battering. This may be illustrated by
considering the leading Bethel and Singer article in which the authors ar-
274. JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 7-8 (1984).
275. Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 269 (1988).
276. Id. at 469.
277. Id.
278. Bryan supra note 122; Grillo, supra note 67; Hart, supra note 226; Lerman, supra note
244. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL. 1: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1982); Neil Vidmar, Procedural Justice and Alternative Dispute Res-
olution, 3 PSYCHOL. SCi. 224 (1992); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined Settlements
and Summary Jury Trials: Observation About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary
Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89 (1991).
1993] 2157
SMU LAW REVIEW
gued that mediation is an appropriate remedy for domestic disputes involv-
ing violence. 279
Bethel and Singer acknowledge that mediation may not be appropriate in
instances where there is "serious repeated physical abuse" or where the com-
plainant is "too fearful" of the respondent, but they also argue that these
disqualifications may be too conservative since there are no data to show
that mediation would be ineffective in such cases. 280 Below we consider
eight purported advantages of the mediation forum and weigh them against
our insights about the culture of battering.
1. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: Abuse arises out of conflict.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Conflict is only the pretext for
abuse.
In Bethel and Singer's words, "[m]ediation .. .should be considered a
crisis-intervention technique. Regardless of the number or seriousness of
prior conflicts, some recent event has precipitated mediation."'28' This state-
ment reflects mediation ideology ,that presumes that disputes develop out of
conflict. In the context of assault and battery criminal cases, the assumption
is that the abuse is a product of conflict. As we have illustrated, however,
culture of battering relationships are not about conflict but rather about
domination and control. To the extent that conflict is present it is only a
symptom. The conflict is manufactured by the abuser in the relationship.282
To structure mediation sessions as if the cause of abuse is conflict is to artifi-
cially frame the problem of battering. This is reflected in the typical medi-
ated agreement, where the abuser promises not to batter if his partner will,
in turn, cease objectionable behavior such as going out in the evening. 283 Or
the trade-off for ceased abuse may be less directly victim-blaming, like her
promise to have contact or discussions with the abuser.284 The serious dan-
ger with this approach is that the actual process as well as the formal written
document that emerges from mediation will mimic the rule-oriented dynam-
ics of the abusive relationship. Mediation may legitimize the abuser's prac-
tice of identifying as the cause of the abuse the victim's behaviors, including
acts of rebellion, that are temporally proximate to physical assaults or other
abusive incidents. 285 This potentially increases the risk that victims will ex-
perience abuse after mediation.
A related danger that flows from mediation's focus on abuse as the prod-
279. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212.
280. Id. at 16.
281. Id. at 17.
282. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
283. See generally William L. F. Felstiner & Lynne A. Williams, Mediation as an Alterna-
tive to Criminal Prosecution: Ideology and Limitations, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 223 (1978)
[hereinafter Felstiner & Williams].
284. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (example of agreement from Bethel &
Singer's center). This type of agreement allows the abuser to dominate and control the victim
through words. Even if those words are not abusive, she is required to "listen" to him. The
victim should always control whether or not she has contact with the abuser.
285. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
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uct of conflict is the risk to justice for battered women. As Barbara Hart
pointed out, safety, a right that exists prior to any mediation session, should
be non-negotiable. 286 No one should have to give anything up in exchange
for the cessation of abuse against her. Any agreement that is structured in
the format of "Mr. Abuser agrees to stop the abuse and Ms. Victim agrees to
-" is conceptually wrong. The point is that anything that goes into that
blank is a violation of her rights. She should never be forced to engage in,
abstain from, or surrender anything to stop the abuse. This dictum should
apply even if what is given up seems trivial or reasonable to the outside
observer, such as "stay home one night per week" (an example suggested by
Felstiner and colleagues) 2 87 or "talk with him about any issue" (an example
reported by Bethel and Singer).2 88 Minimal justice standards would label
this practice as grossly unfair to battered women attempting to end abusive
relationships. They should never leave mediation with agreements that have
bargained away their safety rights and/or made these rights conditional on
some necessary performance of their own. Such a "contract" perpetuates
the conditions they had to suffer during their marriage.
Closely connected to the problem with the format of agreements like "Mr.
Abuser agrees to stop the abuse and Ms. Victim agrees to talk with him
about any issue" is the troubling content of that provision that emerged out
of mediation. This type of agreement allows the abuser to dominate and
control the victim through words. Even if those words are not abusive, she
is required to "listen" to him. Whether or not she has contact with the
abuser should always be a choice under the control of the victim, not the
abuser. An agreement of this type forces the victim to give up a right just as
basic as the right to be free of abuse-the right to have control over when
and about what she will converse with another person. This agreement
would allow the abuser to interrogate the victim about her social activities
and private life in much the same way that he might have during the time
they lived together. Restricting her ability to break away from contact with
the abuser that she determines is unpleasant, harassing, or abusive is not an
appropriate use of mediation.
For divorce cases where child custody or property settlements are dis-
puted, these conflicts may be equally likely to be manufactured by the bat-
terer, as he may raise the issues as a pretext for regaining power in the
relationship and exerting his usual system of control and domination.
Martha Mahoney warned of this possibility: "[T]he custody action is part of
an ongoing attempt, through physical violence and legal manipulation, to
force the woman to make concessions or return to the violent partner. '289
Because batterers use threats against the children - especially to take them
away from their mothers - and abuse the children to control the woman, it is
plausible to view custody "disputes" as suspicious in cases where a culture of
286. Hart, supra note 226, at 325.
287. See Felstiner & Williams, supra note 283.
288. See Bethel & Singer, supra note 212.
289. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 78.
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battering has been established. 290 Similar dynamics may operate in property
settlements. Batterers use family financial resources to control their victims
both physically and psychologically. 291 Mediation sessions may simply be-
come another forum for this coercion. Whether the issue is property or chil-
dren, the mediation model of ameliorating conflict presumes, and therefore
imposes, a conflict structure on a situation where these issues may not be
truly disputed. The danger for battered women who have recently extracted
themselves from a culture of battering is that the batterers' domination and
control tactics will flourish in the mediation environment and not be recog-
nized as such.
2. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: Focus on future, not past behav-
ior.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Ignoring past behavior denies vic-
tims' experiences of violence.
According to Bethel and Singer, "[u]nlike legal remedies, mediation is
prospectively rather than retrospectively centered and is not concerned with
determining rights and wrongs" but is focused on "future conduct. '292 This
component of the mediation ideology is partially responsible for the policy of
many mediation centers to exclude attorneys from the mediation session
even though the victim's attorney may be the primary source of support and
protection for the victim's rights.293
Yet, the culture of battering is ineluctably tied to an escalating history of
domination and control. The batterer and the victim cannot, and should
not, be separated from their history. The specific failure to consider right
and wrong allows an assumption that the victim may be responsible for her
plight. The mediation process then treats the victim as though she shares
responsibility, in essence subtly classifying her as a perpetrator. In short, the
mediation model is not geared to either recognize or deal with the underly-
ing cause of battering.
Consider Bethel and Singer's response to the argument for setting history
aside: "[m]ediation is not therapy. Mediation's goal is to help effect behav-
ioral change, because it is specific behavior, assaultive behavior or threaten-
ing behavior, that one or both parties cannot tolerate. Attitudinal change
... is not the paramount goal of mediation." [F]undamental personality or
attitudinal change is not required to prevent many forms of domestic vio-
lence."' 294 They go on to state that the process of mediation "requires the
parties to focus on crucial rather than peripheral issues, and it allows little
room for excuses." '295
290. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (batterers use threats against the chil-
dren or abuse children to control victim).
291. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
292. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 17.
293. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 244, at 59 (inadequate agreement reached at hearing in
which lay mediators refused wife's request to have her attorney present).
294. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 17, 18.
295. Id.
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Two interrelated problems are inherent in this aspect of mediation ideol-
ogy. First, the assumption that attitude change is not a goal of mediation
shifts the process away from the root cause of abuse. Second, it assumes the
problem is a specific conflict or set of conflicts and that peripheral incidents
are of no consequence. Yet, the peripheral matters are reflective of the total
relationship between the two parties. Regardless of whether some form of
therapy can ultimately transform the parties and their relationship, conclud-
ing that the history, attitudes, and behaviors associated with the relationship
as peripheral simply because they are not explicitly associated with the origi-
nal dispute is to ignore the realities of victims' experiences. Being battered
involves more than the specific acts of violence committed by the abuser; it
means living in a relationship with a partner who systematically dominates
and controls your activities, your relationships with other people, your be-
liefs and values, and your body. Labeling this experience as "peripheral"
delegitimizes the victim's right to bring the abuse up as an issue in mediation
even though it may be extremely relevant to how custody and visitation
should be arranged, or how property should be divided.
3. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: Each party participates equally in
the search for a mutual agree-
ment.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Equal participation is impossible.
Another of Bethel and Singer's ideological statements addresses the pro-
cess of mediation: "The parties are treated as responsible adults and in turn
are expected to participate actively in the search for a mutually acceptable
agreement. '296
This expectation that the parties should participate actively in the media-
tion session is also problematic. Mediation theorists consistently evoke the
theme that participation is a self empowering process. 297 They assert that
helping to shape the outcome that is the subject matter of the forum compels
even a weak party to find new strength. However, to participate and become
self empowered the weaker party must be able to articulate needs and
desires. This may be extremely difficult for a victim of spousal abuse because
she may not even understand her position, may have been consistently si-
lenced by her partner, and may fear the consequences of speaking out. Fur-
ther, the task of negotiating an agreement runs a grave risk of simply
mimicking the battering culture. The mediation session may in fact be a safe
as well as powerful setting for the abuser to intimidate and control his victim
through hidden symbols of impending violence. Even his mere presence
may be intimidating, particularly if she is attempting to escape from the rela-
tionship; contact with the abuser is often the last thing that victims want.
This issue for battered women is consistent with the general problems that
296. Id.
297. DIANE NEUMAN, How MEDIATION CAN EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE MALE-FE-
MALE POWER IMBALANCE IN DIVORCE 238 (1992); Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 18;
Corcoran & Melamed, supra note 220, at 310; Yellot, supra note 213, at 45.
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women may have when they are involved in domestic issues mediation.
Trina Grillo has argued that mediation's emphasis on joint needs may push
the woman away from an attempt to define herself as a person with needs
and rights that are independent of the spousal relationship. 298 The media-
tion process may evoke feelings of guilt and socialized tendencies to
subordinate self needs to relationships with others and acquiesce in the face
of social pressure. Clearly, abused women may often experience certain
characteristics in the extreme, such as feelings of dependency, uncertainty
about self worth, and self-censoring tendencies to deny their own needs.
Thus, the mediation process, with its emphasis on compromise and healing
relationships may actually serve to undo the abused woman's initial steps to
find empowerment as an individual person.
Finally, the emphasis of mediation ideology on joint participation may
make the mediator insensitive to the needs of an abused woman or even
cause the mediator to view the woman as uncooperative. Our own exper-
iences with some mediators are quite consistent with the following observa-
tion by Grillo:
When I have suggested to mediators that even being forced to sit across
the table and negotiate, unassisted, with a spouse might be traumatic,
their reaction has been almost uniformly dismissive. Some mediators
have denied that this could possibly be the case. Even mediators who
acknowledge the possibility of trauma have said, in effect, "So what?"
A few hours of discomfort seems not so much to ask in return for a
system that, to their mind, serves the courts and the children much
better than the alternative [of legal action]. 299
Bethel and Singer further state that "[m]ediation relies on a rough parity
in bargaining power between the parties to be successful. If one side domi-
nates the other there is much less chance that any agreement will be truly
voluntary or that it will accurately reflect the parties' needs. '"300 Indeed!
And by its very nature the culture of a battering makes the couple unequal in
subtle and pervasive ways.
4. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: Avoid blame and findings of fact.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Avoidance of abuse issues per-
petuates status quo of victim
responsibility and abuser domina-
tion.
"Mediation is an informal, participatory method of conflict resolution.
The mediator ... has no higher authority to invoke, and rebuffs requests to
make findings of fact or decisions about blameworthiness. ' ' 30i If followed,
this tenet of mediation ideology eschews any actions by mediators relating to
the parties as anything but equals and prevents mediators from looking for
298. Grillo, supra note 67, at 1607-08.
299. Id. at 1606-07.
300. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 19.
301. Id. at 18.
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elements in the relationship that might indicate a culture of battering. The
tenet forces the mediator to treat spousal abuse and domination neutrally.
Because batterers place the responsibility and blame for the assaults on the
victim, frequently tying the abuse to her inability to live up to his rules, the
status quo of the relationship is left in place when his belief system is left
unchallenged. By ignoring the context of the abuse under the guise of avoid-
ing blame, the mediator leaves behind any opportunity to learn about how
the abuser might attempt to control and dominate the victim during media-
tion sessions.
5. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: Private caucuses will encourage
the victim to speak her needs.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Private caucuses will not assist
victims who are afraid of the
consequences of speaking their
needs.
"The process is participatory, but the nature of the participation is con-
trolled by the mediator .... -302 Bethel and Singer recognize that the media-
tor may communicate individually, through caucuses with the parties, to
develop the agreement. It is assumed that getting the victim alone will allow
her to state her true feelings, wants, and needs. This assumption naively
ignores the fear and psychological control that develops in culture of bat-
tering relationships and extends beyond the immediate physical presence of
the abuser. If the relationship has been one where the victim has been pun-
ished for having or speaking her needs,30 3 she may be justifiably afraid of the
consequences of doing so, even if she is unable to articulate this fear. Spend-
ing five minutes alone with the victim, as Erickson and McKnight urge, 3° 4
will not substantially reduce the reality of this fear or enhance her trust of
the mediators. In fact, it is absurd to believe that a five minute caucus can
uncover and rectify the effects of being silenced through months or years of
abuse - presuming, of course, that the mediator earns the trust of the victim
who truly wishes to disclose her history and experiences.
6. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: Batterers need to be coerced into
mediation.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Batterers may coerce victims into
mediation.
As explained by Erickson and McKnight, "[m]ediation is to some extent a
voluntary process, but one party may participate only because it is the least
objectionable of several alternatives. The prospect of court action, or further
police involvement, or retaliation from the other party, may have substantial
302. Id.
303. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text. See also Hart, supra note 226, at 319-
22 (anecdotes from interviews with women dissatisfied with mediation).
304. Erickson & McKnight, supra note 127, at 381.
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coercive effect." '305 This assertion seems to focus on the inducements to
bring the batterer to the mediation forum. 3°6 It ignores the possibility that
the batterer may prefer mediation because it places him in a situation where
he can continue to dominate. Moreover, it clearly glosses over the pressures
that may force the reluctant victim into mediation. Some women may go to
mediation only because it is cheaper, or it is their only recourse because a
judge or other authority has ordered it, or they cannot receive legal support
unless they submit to mediation first.30 7
7. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: The novelty of a written agree-
ment detailing the rules of the
relationship will end the violence.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Rules in a battering relationship
may justify the batterer's further
abuse.
The culmination of the mediation ideology is usually a written agreement
specifying the rules and obligations of the parties' relationship. Each of sev-
eral examples provided by Bethel and Singer articulates rules.308 Yet, as our
analysis of culture of battering relationships clearly illustrates, the relation-
ship is already filled with rules imposed on the victim by the batterer. It is
the violation of these rules that leads to the violence and abuse. Because the
agreements place obligations on the victim as well as the batterer, any minor
infraction of these rules by the victim may provide the batterer with an ex-
cuse to abandon his obligations. Moreover, he now has a written text to help
justify his outrage. 30 9
8. IDEOLOGY OF MEDIATION: The process of mediation can pro-
tect battered women from future
violence.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Battered women will not disclose
abuse to mediators, during or
after sessions.
If Bethel and Singer's conclusion from their study of violent and nonvio-
lent mediated cases is to be believed, mediation prevents further violence
against victims. 3 10 Aside from the need to replicate this sort of research
finding before the strength of that conclusion can be assessed, several aspects
of the culture of battering dynamics raise questions about the disclosure of
abuse to mediators and the prevention of further abuse.
The notion that the process of mediation will "heal" the relationship is
305. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 19.
306. See Hart, supra note 226; Lerman, supra note 244, at 67-71.
307. See, e.g., Ellis & Stuckless, supra note 213.
308. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 22-24.
309. See supra note 57-58 (abuser from Angela Browne's study who created written agree-
ment involving his cessation of violence in return for her freedom to refuse to have sex with
him but used agreement as an excuse to rape her repeatedly).
310. See supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
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anchored in the abuse-is-conflict framework. Changing the couple's commu-
nication strategies to include non-abusive ones will only be effective outside
mediation if those "strategies" are the cause of the abuse. Because much of
the violence in battering relationships occurs "out of the blue" or at the end
of manufactured arguments, the healing power of the mediation session is
likely to be limited.
This ideological statement that mediation will end the violence also has an
underlying assumption that mediators will somehow know if the victim is
currently being abused. The culture of battering involves an element of hid-
ing, denying, and minimizing the abuse. Much abuse is itself hidden, leaving
no visible marks: sexual assaults, emotional abuse and threats, familial
abuse. Even physical abuse may not leave marks if the batterer chooses to
hit where the bruises on the victim's body will not be revealed to others. The
parties may cancel mediation sessions until the bruises fade away (in the
event that mediation lasts for more than one session) in much the same way
that battered women stay home from work or school until their injuries
heal. 3 1' If mediators send the message that abuse is irrelevant or peripheral,
this may intensify the victim's feelings of shame, and she may be even less
likely to disclose the abuse.
As a final thought on the ideology of mediation with violent couples, in
cases where the couple is separated (all divorce cases and probably the ma-
jority of criminal cases), the risk for serious violence is heightened. The
abuser's ability to dominate and control his partner through abuse becomes
more limited as his access to her decreases. Consequently, his motivation for
obtaining access to her through any means possible, including formal inter-
action with the legal system through court-mandated mediation sessions, is
quite high. Sadly, scheduled court proceedings can lead to an opportunity to
kill, as they were in one recent death for a battered woman: Shirley Lowery
was killed by her estranged husband as she arrived in a Wisconsin court-
house lobby to wait for the hearing for her second order of protection. 312
Mediators must never forget that separation is the most dangerous time for a
battered woman, and avoid allowing the contact that the sessions require to
become the abuser's safe opportunity to strike out with violence against his
partner.
B. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF MEDIATION PRACTICE WITH THE
CULTURE OF BATTERING
Many advocates of mediation concede that mediation may not be appro-
priate in more serious spousal abuse cases but that such cases can be
screened out ahead of time. Well-trained mediators, it is argued, will iden-
tify these cases during mediation and take appropriate action. Advocates
also argue that in cases with less serious spousal abuse, mediators can cor-
rect the imbalance of power and put the victim on a level playing field. For
311. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
312. Don Terry, Killing of Woman Waiting for Justice Sounds Alert on Domestic Violence,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1992, at Al.
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example, Neuman asserts that "[d]ivorce mediators recognize the degree of
power held by their clients, assess the effect of the imbalance of power upon
the negotiations, and employ techniques to intervene in the balance of power
to provide a forum in which to have fair negotiations."'3 13 These assertions
conflict with the systemic and organizational realities of mediation in prac-
tice and with the actual implementation of the ideology that guides most
mediators.
1. PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: Mediation is freely chosen by both
parties.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Mediation involves economic coer-
cion for battered women.
Cases get to mediation through different routes. Through the exercise of
discretion allowed in statutes, judges, prosecutors, and court clerks routinely
divert both cases in which spousal abuse is the main issue314 as well as the
many other divorce, child custody, and other domestic cases where a culture
of battering may be present but in which abuse is not the legal issue before
the court.315 Many cases, including those involving criminal assault
charges, end up in mediation as a direct result of the "recruiting" activities
of dispute resolution centers. Most centers have a working relationship with
court officials in which dispute center personnel peruse court filings to find
''appropriate" cases for mediation and recommend to the judge or district
attorney that an attempt should be made to divert these cases out of the
court system into mediation. The dispute center and the court have a symbi-
otic relationship. Diverting cases to mediation removes them from crowded
court dockets; the dispute resolution center, usually dependent on yearly
grants and other soft sources of funds, get cases that help to justify its exist-
ence and continued funding.316 There is, of course, nothing inappropriate
about the motivation of either the court or the dispute resolution center.
The difficulty, however, is that screening for culture of battering cases is, at
best, likely to be perfunctory. Such cases cannot usually be ascertained from
court files, and mediation center personnel who conduct the screenings are
typically not trained to identify the elements involved in these relationships.
Moreover, mediation center personnel have a strong motivation to find as
many cases as the dispute center can handle.
The argument often made by these centers is that mediation is faster and
cheaper than litigation.3 17 To the extent that this claim is true, it may also
be the central concern of a victim who agrees to the mediation forum over
313. Neuman, supra note 297, at 237.
314. See, e.g., Morton Bard, Ph.D. & Hamet Connolly, Ph.D., The Police and Family Vio-
lence: Policy and Practice, in BATTrERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 304, 307 (1978);
Final Evaluation Report, supra note 213, at 82-83 (judges conceded that cases of "excessive
violence" were not appropriate for mediation but expressed considerable disagreement on the
definition and treatment of such cases); Lerman, supra note 244, at 67-71.
315. See, e.g., Erickson & McKnight, supra note 127; Hart, supra note 226.
316. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 244, at 68.
317. Bethel & Singer, supra note 212, at 16; Bryan, supra note 122, at 441 n.1.
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the court process, thus making the voluntariness of her participation akin to
a contract of adhesion. Indeed, it appears that in some jurisdictions women
are informed that if they do not consent to mediation they will not be eligible
for legal aid.318 The reality is that a mediated settlement is all the legal aid
they will receive. In some parts of the country, divorce mediation is free. 319
Battered women are particularly vulnerable to the pressures of legal aid or
the prospect of free legal assistance because the abuser frequently controls
the family finances.3 20 In the face of these types of economic incentives to
"voluntarily" engage in mediation, the argument that mediation does not
involve coercion 321 rings hollow.
2. PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: Mediators are trained to deal with
domestic violence when the issue
arises.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: Mediators are trained to concep-
tualize violence as a tactic of con-
flict rather than control.
A body of literature is developing that shows that in practice mediators
have great difficulty in coping with intimations of violence when it arises in
mediation sessions and, as critics of mediation ideology have feared, either
ignore it or construe it in a way that harms the victim.
Lisa Lerman, for example, relates the case study of Mrs. Carson who was
a reluctant participant in mediation and instead wanted an order of protec-
tion against her husband.3 22 Two volunteer mediators in a community me-
diation center refused to allow an attorney to observe the mediation
session. 323 The agreement that resulted from the session specified when her
husband could visit the children and when he could telephone her.324 The
agreement said nothing about the violence. During the mediation session
the husband would not admit to any abuse even though he had beaten her
over a period of twenty-five years, including pushing her through a plate
glass window.325 As a result of a prior beating, Mrs. Carson suffered blood
clots that required anti-coagulant medication to treat; consequently, a subse-
quent beating could end in death.326 In a private caucus session the
mediators shifted attention away from the abuse and went so far as to tell
Mrs. Carson that she should listen to her husband. 327 She subsequently ob-
tained an order of protection but that did not prevent her husband from
318. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 226, at 321.
319. See Chandler, supra note 126, at 335.
320. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
321. See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 467
(1991).
322. Lerman, supra note 244, at 57-61.
323. Id. at 59.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 58-59.
326. Id. at 58.
327. Id. at 59.
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beating her again some months later.3 28 The fact that the order of protec-
tion did not further protect Mrs. Carson in no way exonerates the abysmal
failure of the mediation sessions that refused to even address the violence. 329
The typicality of Lerman's example has been documented by others. 330
Cobb and Rifkifi ascribe at least part of the problem to the conflict between
the mediators' conceptions of neutrality and their attempts to balance impar-
tiality while remaining equidistant from both parties.33' Mediators are not
equipped to deal with violence or the threat of violence because it is antithet-
ical to the ideology of mediation. Thus, in discourse with the parties they
may marginalize and reinterpret violence to fit with their notions that dis-
putes are a result of conflict, that the history of relationships is unimportant,
and the empowering process of participation and agreement leaves room for
discussion.
3. PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: Mediators can employ power-bal-
ancing strategies to equalize nego-
tiating power.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: No technique can compensate for
the impact of the battering experi-
ence.
Even in the rare instance that mediators recognize the seriousness of abuse
in a battering relationship and attempt to balance the power between the
parties,332 this compensation is inadequate. As others have argued, even the
notion that power which has been grossly imbalanced over the course of an
entire multi-year relationship can be shifted within a two hour mediation
session minimizes the seriousness of the impact of the abuse on battered wo-
men. 333 Balancing the power means that the weaker party can arrive at the
point where she is free to express her needs to the other. As we suggested
above, fear of the consequences may prevent the battered woman from doing
so because voicing her needs is tantamount to "rebellion" in the eyes of the
abuser, who has consistently punished her for self-assertion.33 4 Nor should
it necessarily be the goal of mediators to assist battered women in "moving
beyond" their fear. Rooted in prior experience, their fear is not irrational.
Mediation cannot promise to protect battered women from the abuse that
might result from expressing their needs, which does not facilitate the crea-
tion of a safe environment where they can actually do so.
328. Id. at 59-60.
329. In fact, it is plausible that the refusal of the mediators, as representatives of the legal
system, to make the abuser accountable for his violence encouraged Mr. Carson to ignore the
dictates of another component of the legal system.
330. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 67, at 1584-85; Hart, supra note 226, at 321-22; see also
Sara Janet Cobb & Rifkin, Practice and Paradox; Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation, 16
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 35 (1991) [hereinafter Cobb & Rifkin]; Ellis & Stuckless, supra note
213, at 221-22; Yellot, supra note 213, at 45 (author still advocates mediation in some cases).
331. Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 330, at 43-44.
332. See, e.g., Girdner, supra note 264, at 372-75.
333. E.g., Hart, supra note 226, at 318.
334. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
2168 [Vol. 46
MEDIATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Even assuming for the moment that battered women are able to voice
their needs in a mediation session, they have to be able to identify and then
label those needs as a prerequisite. From the culture of battering perspec-
tive, there are two forces that prevent women from being able to express
themselves. First, battered women have been socialized over the course of
their abusive relationship to pay attention to the abuser's needs and to deni-
grate their own. Earlier we referred to this as "self-censorship," where the
victim's denial of her own needs and the primacy of the batterer's is gradu-
ally shaped less by external punishment and more by internal processes. a35
Because self-censorship is internalized, physical separation from the batterer
may not change her instincts to focus on the abuser's needs in the mediation
session and not her own. Second, the oppression a battered woman exper-
iences during the abusive relationship may impede either her ability to even
know what her needs are, or her ability to speak about her needs in ways that
can be understood by others. This is captured concretely by the battered
women in our opening anecdote: "[I feel that] my opinion doesn't ever
count."' 336 Despite the best efforts of the most sensitive and nurturing
mediators, a setting that does not validate her experiences of violence can
never make a battered woman feel as if she counts.
Finally, the deployment of power-balancing strategies by mediators may
be trumped by the hidden symbols of dominance and control shared only by
the couple. Whether these symbols of impending violence are a figuratively
drawn line, a nose-scratch, or a fleeting facial change, mediators cannot be
aware and cannot be trained to recognize these idiosyncratic gestures.
Although some mediators may be able to identify these tactics if they have
an overt impact on the victim's behavior,3 37 the victim may have been
trained or warned not to flinch, or she may not be consciously aware of the
connection between his behavioral change and the meaning of that change
for her.
4. PRACTICE OF MEDIATION: Mediators can screen effectively for
domestic violence.
CULTURE OF BATTERING: None of the currently used screen-
ing protocols adequately assess
abuse or the other elements of the
culture.
The screening protocols used for domestic violence cases fall short on two
dimensions: 1) their failure to ask about all forms of abuse rather than just
physical; and 2) their failure to recognize the cultural components of bat-
tering instead of nesting questions about abuse within a conflict perspective.
The screening device used in the Hawaiian program described by Chan-
dler,338 a single physical abuse question, is flawed because of its exclusivity
335. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
336. Fischer, supra note 1.
337. Girdner, supra note 264, at 368-69; Erickson & McKnight, supra note 127, at 380.
338. See supra note 261-63 and accompanying text.
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of the physical abuse domain. The device attempts to get at the impact of
this abuse, which overlaps some with control and domination, by asking
about whether she is afraid of her husband or whether the abuse had an
impact on her ability to negotiate effectively. The problem with asking wo-
men for their estimation about whether the abuse has affected them is that
battered women may deny and minimize the impact of the abuse just as they
do the abuse itself.3 39 The Hawaiian protocol would be more effective (but
still inadequate) if the first question asked was whether or not women feel
they can negotiate on an equal basis with their spouses, and if it was fol-
lowed by the fear and abuse questions as probes for whether their perceived
lesser negotiating status is connected to their fear of their partner or past
abuse. The question of whether she "has ever been physically abused" could
probably be reworded more sensitively to normalize the impact of the bat-
tering experience. For example: "Many women who feel that they can't ne-
gotiate on an equal basis with their husbands have been abused or injured in
some way by him; can you tell me if you have had any of the following
experiences?"
Girdner's Conflict Assessment Protocol includes content that is directed
to the control and domination elements of the culture of battering, but the
questions about control are framed by others requesting information about
conflict resolution tactics. Girdner's protocol also conceptualizes abuse as
more than physical assaults; it has the advantage of assessing emotional and
sexual abuse (although it does leave out familial abuse). These questions
unfortunately follow those about conflict, so the risk is that only abuse that
occurs in this context will be identified. 34 °
An effective screening device would build on the content, but not the
framework, of both Girdner and Chandler. Each of the elements of the cul-
ture of battering should be addressed independently of the others. Abuse
could be assessed with some combination of emotional, physical, and sexual
abuse scales used in research. 34 1 Many of the questions Girdner asks about
control would be useful in assessing the extent of domination and rule-mak-
ing in the relationship. 342 Particular attention would need to be paid to as-
pects of rebellion (e.g. "Have you ever felt that if you did something that you
knew your partner didn't want you to do, that you would have to pay the
consequences for it?") and self censorship (e.g. "Do you ever decide not to
do or say certain things, even small things, because you know it will make
your husband angry?"). Wayland and Lochman's ten item fear scale, devel-
oped for research with abusive couples, provides a good model for identify-
ing the level of fear in the relationship (e.g. "I find myself walking on
eggshells around my partner."). 343 The third element of the culture of bat-
339. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
341. See Fischer, supra note I, at 62 tbl. 9 (example of abuse scale).
342. Girdner, supra note 264, at 368-69. Mahoney suggested a more global question to
assess domination: "have you ever experienced inappropriate control attempts by [your] part-
ner[?]" Mahoney, supra note 47, at 69.
343. Wayland & Lockman, supra note 75. Other examples include: "I keep things from
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tering (denial, minimization, hiding) could involve questions such as
whether she has ever felt that she couldn't tell others how her partner was
treating her, or whether she stayed away from other people during certain
"bad" periods in the relationship. Regardless of the particular content of
questions asked in a screening protocol, answers that indicate that a culture
of battering may be present should be carefully explored with follow-up
questions.
C. SUMMARY
Both the ideology and the practice of mediation are incompatible with the
culture of battering, suggesting that mediation should not be used where a
culture of battering has been established. The ideology of mediation artifi-
cially forces a conflict resolution paradigm on the problem of abuse where
there may be not genuine conflict, just control and domination. Mediation's
focus on future rather than past behavior and tendency to avoid blame de-
nies the victim's experiences of violence and delegitimizes. her right to talk
about it. While the ideology of mediation promises equal participation, the
reality of a culture of battering precludes victims from being able to voice
their needs. The ideology of mediation also falsely holds that the batterers
need to be coerced into mediation, that the rules provided in a written agree-
ment will fundamentally change the battering relationship, and that media-
tion can protect battered women from further abuse. None of these claims
holds up under close scrutiny when viewed through the lens of a culture of
battering.
The practice of mediation is incompatible with the culture of battering
because it economically and psychologically coerces battered women into
participating and ignores violence as a tool of coercion and control. Stan-
dard techniques used to balance power during the negotiation sessions will
not be effective where a culture of battering has been established. Mediators
are similarly ill-equipped to properly screen for a culture of battering.
V. CONCLUSION
Mediation has been marketed to courts and policy makers on the grounds
that it is better, fairer, and cheaper. Ideally, it transforms and empowers the
parties, and, at the same time, reduces the load on court dockets. It has been
widely adopted as a panacea for the inadequacies and troubles of our con-
temporary legal system. Within this atmosphere, so-called "domestic rela-
tions" cases are particularly subject to pressures to mediate.
Other scholars and practitioners have raised serious questions about
whether mediation may have the opposite result from the results that advo-
cates claim for it. They assert that it jeopardizes the rights of women and
others who are lacking in traditional power. We join these critics of the
mass movement toward mediation by arguing that many cases of serious
my partner in the interests of keeping the peace;" "I find it hard to relax and be myself around
my mate;" and "I feel relieved when my mate comes home or wakes up in a good mood." Id.
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spousal abuse are thrown into mediation and that the ideology and practice
of mediation are generally incompatible with the goal of protecting the rights
and safety of battered women.
Reconceptualizing spousal abuse in terms of a culture of battering is con-
sistent with knowledge of spousal abuse and shifts the focus from individual
actions of the two involved parties to the dynamics of their relationship. The
notion of a culture of battering captures the pattern of domination and con-
trol in spousal abuse which includes: the elements of rule making; internal-
ization of the rules by the victim; the process of self-censorship; the
enforcement of rules by punishment or threat of punishment; and the abus-
ers' responses to victims' rebellion or resistance. It consequently rejects con-
flict as the cause of spouse abuse. It raises the strong possibility that such a
culture may be present in "domestic relations" cases where the legal matter
is not spousal assault but rather divorce, child custody, or division of prop-
erty. Finally, it exposes as myth the claim that spousal abuse can be easily
identified by lay or professional mediators just asking a few questions of the
victim.
Viewed from a culture of battering perspective, mediation ideology and
practice is incompatible with the rights and safety of victims of spouse abuse.
A central tenet of mediation theorists and practitioners is that domestic vio-
lence arises out of conflict rather than the pattern of domination and control
over the victim that is at its core. By focusing on future behavior, mediation
ignores the relational history that is part and parcel of the abuse. Mediation
is billed as an empowering, transforming process for the parties in which
each participates equally. The mediator is charged with rectifying power
imbalances, but, within a culture of battering, correction of power imbal-
ances is unlikely if not impossible. Emerging research also shows that be-
cause of mediators' orientation and training, they do not know how to
respond to the signs of violence or threats of violence; thus, they transform
them into procedural issues with the consequences that victims' rights are
delegitimized. Finally, mediators' proclivities to develop written contracts
specifying rules of future behavior may force the victim into unwanted con-
tact with her abuser and set the stage for further violence for any perceived
infraction of the rules.
The problems of mediation are compounded by statutes and programs
that give mediators power to exclude advocates and legal counsel from the
mediation sessions. This practice may enhance the power of both the bat-
terer and the mediator to the detriment of the victim. Ironically, the process
of mediation sometimes functions to cut victims off from sources of moral
and other support just as their abusers isolate them. Additionally, as evi-
denced by mediation statutes and descriptions of mediation programs, there
is often no provision for screening culture of battering cases out of the medi-
ation process. Statutes and programs that do provide for exemptions fail to
establish criteria for exclusion and some permit the mediator to do the
screening. Finally, most mediators do not have the qualifications and train-
ing to cope with culture of battering cases, are unable to identify abuse when
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it is present, and, as mentioned above, ignore or minimize it when victims
attempt to bring it to their attention.
We conclude, therefore, that mediation should not be used in cases where
a culture of battering exists. While an extremely well-trained mediator
might successfully use mediation in some atypical cases, viewed from a sys-
tem level perspective the odds are much greater that many more victims will
have their rights jeopardized. Our recommendation is relatively easy to im-
plement with respect to cases where the legal issue is the violence itself:
whether civil or criminal, these cases should not be subject to mediation.344
It is more difficult to implement for cases in which the legal issue is divorce,
child custody, or property settlement. How does one screen for culture of
battering cases in order to eliminate them from mandatory mediation?
We have a few suggestions, 3 45 but no easy answer to this question. Our
goal for this article is to call attention to the problems of mediation in cases
of domestic violence. We are not prepared at this point to propose extensive
remedies. Nevertheless, we offer several observations bearing on the issue of
mediation in domestic relations cases.
Working on an assumption that the trend toward mediation of "domestic
relations" cases will remain in place, we have several recommendations.
Mediation in these cases should never be mandatory. Specific exclusions
should be built into statutes and local court rules for cases involving abuse.
Specific exclusions should apply not only to criminal assault cases but also to
protective orders, divorce, child custody, and domestic property disputes.
Rules allowing mediators to exclude legal counsel or victim advocates from
mediation sessions should be abolished. The screening mechanisms by
which cases are recommended for mediation should not be carried out by
representatives of mediation interests. Rather, the screening should be done
by independent persons who have the skills and sensitivity to identify and
assist cases of spousal abuse-such as advocates from battered women's shel-
ters. Further, the screening mechanisms for spousal abuse should specifi-
cally recognize emotional, sexual, familial, and other forms of abuse that we
have identified as the first element of the culture of battering. Finally, better
training and credentialing of mediators is needed so that they are capable of
recognizing and coping with the issues of domestic violence when it is sig-
naled in mediation sessions. Mediators should be trained to terminate medi-
ation when such signs are present and to recommend remedies that will
protect the rights and safety of victims.
At the same time that we offer the above recommendations, we observe
that our analyses of the culture of battering in relation to mediation ideology
and practice raise a warning flag about the trend toward mediation as a pan-
acea for the current ills of the legal system. Of course, mediation is a useful
device for the resolution of some conflicts that find their way into the legal
system. Specifically, it may be very useful for many "domestic relations"
344. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 768(5) (West Supp. 1992) (precluding medi-
ation of protection order cases).
345. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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cases. The difficulty is its wholesale adoption and application on a generic
basis. Advocates for mediation frequently have more zeal for the process
than the evidence or common sense warrants. And their assertions are not
always given proper scrutiny. Consider, for example, the argument of some
mediation advocates that the current adversary legal system is inadequate
for dealing with domestic violence cases. We do not quarrel with this view:
current law and practices frequently do not protect domestic violence vic-
tims' rights and safety. 346 Our dissent is with those who conclude that the
only solution is mediation. The problems with the adversary system should
be addressed directly by statutory or local change rather than being side-
stepped by advocacy for alternative programs such as mediation. Justice for
battered women in the courtroom should include better access to the legal
system and increased legal resources, including an expansion of pro bono
programs and legal aid.347
The arguments of mediation advocates have been appealing to judges and
policy makers for two reasons. Some advocates have made unsubstantiated
claims about the merits of mediation without any empirical basis for doing
so. 348 This article begins to unravel those claims. The second reason is that
mediation promises to be cheaper to the courts and will remove cases that
bother judges and prosecutors. We pose the question here of whether irk-
someness and cost savings are adequate reasons for jeopardizing the health
and sometimes the lives of victims. We further question whether improving
the present legal system with better mechanisms, such as broader relief in
orders of protection, more responsive police action, and increased funding
for domestic violence shelters, might not be as cost-efficient from a societal
perspective in the long run.
As our culture of battering analysis clearly shows, harmony ideology and
the well-meaning but blissfully ignorant practice of mediation are too great a
risk to achieving justice for battered women in the legal system. Refocusing
legal policy away from mediation and towards strategies that truly promote
victim empowerment would assist in returning to domestic violence victims
what is rightfully theirs: control over their activities, their bodies, and their
ability to "count" in the world.
346. See generally Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders ofProtection in Domestic Violence
Cases: An Empirical Assessment ofthe Impact ofthe Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
163 (1993) (discussing limitations of order of protection laws).
347. See id. at 182-85.
348. Rosenberg, supra note 321.
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